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Employees’ lack of compliance with password policies increases password susceptibility, which
leads to financial damages to the organizations as a result of information disclosure, fraud, and
unauthorized transactions. However, few studies have examined what motivates employees to
comply with password policies.
The purpose of this quantitative cross-sectional study was to examine what factors influence
employees’ compliance with password policies. A theoretical model was developed based on
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), General Deterrence Theory (GDT), Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA), and Psychological Ownership Theory to explain employees’ compliance with
password policies.
A non-probability convenience sample was employed. The sample consisted of employees who
work at organizations that have password policies to comply with. Only employees who use
passwords to log in to the organizational accounts can participate. A total of 151 responses were
collected using an adapted survey instrument with a Likert scale. Data were analyzed using the
Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) software and the Smart Partial Least Square
(SmartPLS) software.
The results of this study revealed that self-efficacy, response efficacy, and perceived certainty
sanction have a positive influence on employees’ intention to comply with password policies.
Employees’ intention to comply with password policies was also found to have a positive
influence on employees’ actual compliance. Conversely, the study revealed that perceived
vulnerability threat, perceived severity threat, perceived severity sanction, psychological
ownership, and response cost have an insignificant influence on employees’ intention to comply
with password policies.
This study has practical and theoretical contributions in Information Systems (IS) literature. It
bridged the existing gap by developing a theoretical model and determining what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies. Organizations can effectively tailor
initiatives by focusing on the most impactful predictors to motivate employees’ compliance with
password policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Password has been the most preferred authentication method for many users
despite its shortcomings (Stewart et al., 2008). Furthermore, it has been a major strategy
to protect information and to limit accessing sensitive data for many individuals and
organizations (Furnell et al., 2004). Moreover, it is projected that using password will
remain the most common authentication method in the future (Lo, 2016). Unfortunately,
users have misunderstandings regarding the meaning of a strong password and password
security models (Ur et al., 2016). Additionally, it has been suggested that users lack the
motivation to comply with the challenges and requirements of password guidelines
(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Consequently, users develop poor password practices, such as
reusing the same password for different accounts (Abbott et al., 2018; Stobert & Biddle,
2014), resetting password that is related to the previous one (Habib et al., 2018), and
writing password down (Lo, 2016; Stobert & Biddle, 2014).
According to Lo (2016), changing a password by revising the previously used one
makes it guessable by brute-force and dictionary attacks, and writing the password down
makes it accessible by unauthorized persons. Brute-force attacks try all different
combinations of password's characters to crack it down, depending on raw computing
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power (Bošnjak et al., 2018). On the other hand, the dictionary attack is described as a
type of brute-force technique that uses a database dictionary to guess all possible
passwords (Chakrabarti & Singha, 2007). Therefore, to enhance the strength of a selected
password, the user is required to abide by a given set of rules. These rules are commonly
referred to as password policies. These policies are considered as the essential foundation
to develop and implement efficient and effective passwords (Walters & Matulich, 2011).
Yildirim and Mackie (2019) defined password restriction policies as “a series of rules
which determine the content and format of the passwords accepted by an authentication
system. These policies are used by system administrators to enhance computer security
by guiding users to create more secure passwords” (p. 744).
Problem Statement
The main research problem that this study addressed was employees’ lack of
compliance with password policies. Lack of compliance with password policies increases
password vulnerability and causes numerous security issues (Choong et al., 2014; Habib
et al., 2018; Inglesant & Sassa, 2010; Shay et al., 2010). Compromised passwords may
eventually lead to substantial financial damages to individual users and organizations as a
result of information disclosure, fraud, and unauthorized transactions (Wakefield, 2004).
Similarly, insecure password practices can cause severe security breaches costing
companies millions of dollars (Ives et al., 2004). According to Choong et al. (2014),
employees cope with password policies’ requirements by making a minor modification to
the current password, choosing easy-to-remember passwords, and writing them down. In
2010, Shay et al. carried out qualitative research on university students, staff, and faculty
to understand users’ behaviors and perceptions towards password policies that required
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them to revise their passwords frequently. The results of the study revealed that most
users find password policies annoying although they believe that password policies
provide sufficient security. It was also evident that most users had difficulties in
complying with strict password requirements. Therefore, they share their passwords and
modify old passwords by adding characters and letters. Habib et al. (2018) asserted that
employees undermine the policy of password expiration by expanding and modifying
their previous passwords, which hinder the security goal of resetting passwords.
Moreover, Inglesant and Sassa (2010) examined password policies and practices among
staff members and found that it is challenging to comply with the requirements of
password policies when organizational password policies are firm. As a result of the
difficulties in complying with firm password policies, employees have low security
motivations to comply with the password policies (Adams & Sasse, 1999), whereas
employees’ behavioral motivations have a significant role in performing secure behaviors
(Blythe et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015; Sommestad et al., 2015).
Previous studies have explored extensively employees’ security behaviors in
different Information Systems (IS) contexts. For example, Sommestad et al. (2015)
associated employees’ attitudes toward IS policies, perceived norm, and self-efficacy
with their intention to comply with overall IS policies. Herath and Rao (2009) examined
the influence of employees’ attitudes toward IS policies, perception of security threats,
and perception of sanctions on their intention to comply with IS policies. Posey et al.
(2015) assessed the effect of employees’ commitments on their motivations to engage in
protection behaviors in order to protect organizational information assets. Johnston and
Warkentin (2010) assessed the effect of fear appeal on complying with the recommended
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security actions in order to mitigate threats. Additionally, Blythe et al. (2015)
investigated the motivators and barriers of employees’ compliance with IS policies.
Although several studies have been conducted to predict employees’ behaviors in
different IS contexts (Blythe et al., 2015; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin,
2010; Posey et al., 2015; Sommestad et al., 2015), few studies have been done
specifically to better understand employees’ behaviors toward compliance with password
policies (Anye, 2019; Choong & Theofanos, 2015). Anye (2019) as well as Choong and
Theofanos (2015) effectively associated employees’ attitudes toward password policies
with their intentions to comply with password policies. Anye (2019) recommended future
research to expand the findings by examining how other factors, such as sanctions and
threat appraisal, influence employees’ intention to comply with password policies based
on General Deterrence Theory (GDT) and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
respectively. Based on GDT, previous studies have associated employees’ perception of
severity and certainty sanctions negatively with their intention to misuse IS resources
(D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; D'Arcy et al., 2009), and positively with their intention to
comply with IS policies (Chen et al., 2012). D'Arcy et al. (2009) defined sanction as a
punishment for breaking rules.
On the other hand, PMT is based on both threat appraisal and coping appraisal,
and their influence on individuals’ protection motivation (Rogers, 1975, 1983).
Mwagwabi et al. (2014), as well as Mwagwabi (2015) utilized PMT to investigate how
Internet users’ perceptions of password and security threats influence their intention to
comply with password guidelines when they login to their email accounts. They found
that (1) perceived threat, perceived password effectiveness (response efficacy), and
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password self-efficacy positively influence Internet users’ intentions to comply with
password guidelines, (2) response cost is negatively associated with the intention to
comply with password guidelines, and (3) perceived vulnerability is not related to the
intention to comply with password guidelines. Likwise, in 2017, Kusyanti and Sari
examined students’ intention to change password after receiving a default password and
found that response cost is negatively associated with the intention to change passwords.
In addition, they found that perceived severity, response efficacy, and fear are positively
associated with the intention to change passwords, but not perceived vulnerability.
Conversely, Ifinedo (2012) as well as Siponen et al. (2014) found that perceived
vulnerability positively predicts intention to comply with IS policies in organizational
settings. Therefore, Mwagwabi (2015) suggested utilizing PMT in organizational
settings, where users would behave differently. Based on the previous literature,
employees’ perceptions of threat vulnerability, threat severity, response efficacy, selfefficacy, response cost, severity of sanction, and certainty of sanction can be predictors to
their intention to comply with password policies.
Menard et al. (2018) noted that previous studies have successfully explained IS
behavioral intention by applying psychological ownership theory in IS domain.
Psychological ownership is described as individuals’ developed feelings of ownership
toward a target (Pierce et al., 2003). In 2018, Menard et al. assessed the effect of
employees’ psychological ownership of the information on their protection motivations
and intentions to not protect information, and they recommended examining the impact
of psychological ownership on different types of security behaviors because increasing
perceived psychological ownership of the information within an organization might be an

6
optimal practice to motivate secure behaviors. Accordingly, employees’ perception of
psychological ownership to their organizational account can be a predictor to their
intention to comply with password policies.
Besides the limited research that has examined specifically what factors influence
employees’ intention to comply with password policies, there is a lack of password
research that links the intention to comply with the actual password compliance
behaviors, and there is a need for more studies to determine how intention predicts actual
compliance, which is a new avenue for future research (Mwagwabi, 2015; Mwagwabi et
al., 2018). Nevertheless, it has been found a positive relationship between intention and
actual behaviors in different IS contexts (Boss et al., 2015; Liang & Xue, 2010; Siponen
et al., 2014; Sommestad et al., 2015).
This study addressed the scarcity of research on employees’ lack of compliance
with password policies by investigating the roles of employees’ perceptions of threat
vulnerability, threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, severity of
sanction, certainty of sanction, and psychological ownership. Determining what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies will help organizations to tailor
initiatives, such as education and training, by focusing on the most impactful predictors,
which will motivate employees to comply with password policies.
Goal Statement
The main goal of this quantitative cross-sectional study is to examine what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies. Specifically, this study aimed
to determine what influences employee’s compliance with password policies by
examining the relationship between the independent variables (perceived vulnerability
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threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, & perceived psychological ownership)
and the mediating variable (intention to comply with password policies), as well as the
relationship between the mediating variable (intention to comply with password policies)
and the dependent variable (actual compliance with password policies).
This study was built based on previous studies that were conducted by Mwagwabi
(2015), D'Arcy et al. (2009), Menard et al. (2018), and Siponen et al. (2014). Mwagwabi
(2015) investigated how Internet user’s perceptions of passwords and security threats
influence intention to comply with password guidelines based on PMT. D'Arcy et al.
(2009) utilized GDT to examine the effect of perception of sanctions in deterring users’
misuse of IS resources. Menard et al. (2018) assessed the effect of employees’
perceptions of psychological ownership on their intentions to not protect information.
Moreover, Siponen et al. (2014) examined the relationship between the intentions to
comply with IS policies and the actual compliance behaviors, using Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA).
To accomplish this goal, this study adopted constructs and developed a theoretical
model based on PMT, GDT, and the psychological ownership theory to examine
employee’s intention to comply with password policies and to extend the model based on
TRA to link the intention to comply with password policies with the actual compliance
behaviors. Intention to comply with password policies, which is the mediating variable,
will work as a function of independent variables to understand the dependent variable.
PMT theorizes that when threat evokes, individuals evaluate the situation of threat
cognitively through threat appraisal and its coping mechanism (Rogers, 1975, 1983).

8
GDT posits that the more severity and certainty of sanctions, the more the individuals
will be prevented from committing an illicit act (Gibbs, 1975). Moreover, psychological
ownership theory postulates that when the perception of ownership increases, user’s
motivation to perform behaviors increases to maintain the sense of self-identity, security,
and control (Furby, 1978). Additionally, TRA posits that individuals’ intentions predict
their actual behaviors (Fishbein &Ajzen, 1975).
Research Questions
RQ1: What is the relationship between (a) perceived vulnerability threat, (b)
perceived severity threat, (c) response efficacy, (d) self-efficacy, (e) response cost, (f)
perceived severity sanction of noncompliance, (g) perceived certainty sanction of
noncompliance, (h) perceived psychological ownership of the organizational account, and
employees’ intention to comply with password policies?
RQ2: What is the relationship between employees’ intention to comply with
password policies and their actual compliance with password policies?
Relevance and Significance
Due to the difficulties in complying with the strict password policies, literature
suggests that employees’ motivation to comply with password policies is low, which
increases passwords’ susceptibility (Choong et al., 2014; Habib et al., 2018; Inglesant &
Sassa, 2010; Shay et al., 2010). Compromising passwords causes financial damages to
the organizations as a result of fraud, information disclosure, and unauthorized
transactions (Wakefield, 2004).
Limited research has been conducted to examine specific factors that influence
employees’ intention to comply with password policies (Anye, 2019; Choong &
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Theofanos, 2015). In addition, there is a shortage in research that associates intention to
comply with actual password compliance (Mwagwabi, 2015; Mwagwabi et al., 2018).
This study addressed the scarcity of research by assessing the relationship between
employees’ perceptions of threat vulnerability, threat severity, response efficacy, selfefficacy, response cost, severity of sanction, certainty of sanction, psychological
ownership, and their intention to comply with password policies, as well as the
relationship between intentions to comply with the actual password policies compliance
in order to complete the understanding of employees’ compliance with password policies.
This study contributed to practitioners and information security literature in the
area of IS policies by investigating factors that specifically influence employees’
compliance with password policies. This study filled the existing knowledge gap on the
factors that motivate password policy compliance behaviors by adopting and developing
a theoretical model based on four behavioral theories: PMT, GDT, TRA, and
psychological ownership theory. In addition, the theoretical model constructs were
examined to better understand employees’ compliance with password policies. This
proposed theoretical model can be used in future research.
Determining the factors that influence password policy compliance will provide
organizations with insights into how to motivate compliance with password policies and
will enable organizations to effectively tailor initiatives, such as training and education,
to promote employees’ password compliance in order to protect their passwords from
being compromised. Consequently, organizational financial loss and information
disclosure will be prohibited.
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Weirich and Sasse (2001) asserted that forcing password policies is not sufficient
to ensure compliance, but there is a need to design policies, trainings, and tutorials with
persuasive power to persuade users to do so. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) as well as
Mwagwabi et al., (2014) noted that training techniques require utilizing methods that
motivate and activate users to comply with policies. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010)
asserted that the training approach should be based on theoretical evaluation. Therefore,
this study will help in tailoring initiatives to enhance employees’ compliance with
password policies based on the results of examining the constructs of PMT, GDT, TRA,
and psychological ownership theory. In addition, the results of this study can be
considered by password policies designers.
Moreover, associating employees’ perceptions with their password policies
compliance would help organizations to inspire employees’ password policies
compliance by focusing on the most impactful predictors. For example, inspiring a sense
of psychological ownership would be an optimal practice to induce the employees to
perform secure behaviors (Menard et al., 2018).
Barriers and Issues
This study used a survey instrument to collect data from employees who work at
organizations and have organizational accounts to log in. The barriers in this study are in
achieving a sufficient sample size, in using a convenience sample which negatively
affects the generalizability of the study, and in collecting data about security behaviors.
The participants would not be willing to share information about their compliance with
password policies. To address this concern, the participants were told that the responses
will be anonymous and used only for the study. Another issue is the need of an expert

11
panel to review the adapted instrument before collecting data. Lastly, the institutional
review board (IRB) approval form Nova Southeastern University (NSU) must be
received before collecting data.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
The assumptions of this study include that the participants are honest in
responding to the questionnaire, and all the hypotheses are significantly true. In addition,
this study assumed that the quantitative cross-sectional design would address the research
problem since the main goal is to examine the relationship between employees’
perceptions and compliance with password policies.
The limitations of this study may be the sample size and convenience sample
method, which would affect the accuracy of results and the generalizability, respectively.
Another limitation is that this study is based on self-reported data, which is considered a
common bias technique. In addition, the survey instrument needs an expert panel to
review it because its items are adapted.
The scope of this study is employees’ compliance with password polices which is
under IS security behaviors context. The participants were encouraged to truthfully
respond by ensuring their privacy and confidentiality. In addition, the survey instrument
was simple and easy to understand in order to encourage participants to complete the
survey.
Definition of Terms
The terms in this study are defined as follow:
Protection motivation- “an intervening variable that has the typical characteristics of a
motive: it arouses, sustains, and directs activity” (Rogers, 1975, p. 98).
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Thread appraisal- “threat appraisal evaluates the maladaptive behavior. Factors
comprising the threat-appraisal process are maladaptive response rewards (intrinsic and
extrinsic) and the perception of threat (severity and vulnerability)” (Floyd et al., 2000, p.
410).
Coping appraisal- “the coping-appraisal process evaluates the ability to cope with and
avert the threatened danger. Factors comprising the coping-appraisal process are efficacy
variables (both response efficacy and self-efficacy) and response costs” (Floyd et al.,
2000, p. 410-411).
Perceived threat severity- “degree of harm associated with the threat” (Herath & Rao,
2009, p.111).
Perceived threat vulnerability- “probability of the threat occurring” (Herath & Rao, 2009,
p. 111).
Response efficacy- “the belief that the adaptive response will work, that taking the
protective action will be effective in protecting the self or others" (Floyd et al., 2000, p.
411).
Self-efficacy- “the perceived ability of the person to actually carry out the adaptive
response” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411).
Response cost- “any costs (e.g., monetary, personal, time, effort) associated with taking
the adaptive coping response” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411).
Sanction- a punishment for breaking rules (D’Arcy et al., 2009).
Severity sanction- “degree of punishment” (D’Arcy et al., 2009, p. 83).
Certainty sanction- “the extent to which an individual believes that criminal behavior
will be detected” (Siponen et al., 2010, p. 69).
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Psychological ownership- “state where an individual feels as though the target of
ownership or a piece of that target is ‘theirs’ (i.e., it is MINE!)” (Pierce et al., 2003, p. 5).
Intentions- “intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a
behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an
effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181).
Summary
This introductory chapter provided a research worthy problem in the felid of IS,
specifically focusing on employees’ compliance with password policies. Lack of
compliance with password policies increases passwords vulnerability, which leads to
financial losses to organizations. In this chapter, valid literature supported the problem
and its need to be addressed.
This chapter also identified the main goal of this study. The main goal is to
examine factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
Specifically, this study examines the relationship between perceived vulnerability threat,
perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, perceived psychological ownership,
intention to comply with password policies, and actual compliance with password
policies. A theoretical model is developed based on PMT, GDT, TRA, and psychological
ownership theory to explain employees’ compliance with password policies.
The significance of this study was also addressed. By determining what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies, organizations can tailor
initiatives by focusing on the most impactful predictors to motivate employees’
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compliance with password policies. In addition, this chapter addressed the assumptions,
limitations, delimitations, barriers, and issues of the study.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview
Passwords continue to be the most common authentication technique in most of
organizations despite their vulnerability (Stewart et al., 2008). Therefore, many
companies have turned to the trend of employing password policies to protect passwords.
Despite these measures taken by many organizations, employees fail to abide by these
policies (Choong et al., 2014; Habib et al., 2018). This chapter focuses on identifying the
gaps and addressing the lack in the literature about factors that influence employees’
compliance with password policies by understanding employees’ compliance with
password policies and what factors would influence their behaviors in complying with
password policies. The key issue is to improve employees’ compliance with password
policies to protect organizational passwords from being compromised.
Understanding employees’ IS behaviors and developing a theoretical model will
help improving employees’ compliance with password policies. This study developed a
theoretical model, grounded in four behavioral theories: PMT, GDT, TRA, and
psychological ownership theory. This literature review helped in understanding the role
of these theories’ constructs as factors that would be associated with employees’
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password policies compliance. Additionally, based on the review of literature, most of the
studies in IS context that applied PMT, GDT, TRA, and psychological ownership theory
utilized surveys to examine the association between constructs.
To summarize, this literature review chapter discusses the theoretical foundation
of the study, provides a review of previous literature to identify gaps, includes an analysis
of the research methods used, and gives a synthesis of the literature.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation of this study was based on PMT, GDT, TRA, and
psychological ownership theory. GDT is rooted in classic criminology from the late 18th
century (Mendes & McDonald, 2001) and started to be investigated by sociologists and
psychologists in the early to mid-20th century (Mendes, 2004). GDT is a dependable
theory from an economic view as it embraces that increasing certainty or severity of
punishment will raise the cost expectation that would prevent criminals from committing
illegal acts (Mendes & McDonald, 2001). If the individuals anticipate severe and certain
penalties to offset the reward of an intentional act, then they will not commit the act
(Paternoster, 2010).
PMT was developed in 1975 and revised in 1983 by Rogers. PMT was originally
utilized in health field to explain how fear appeals affect health behaviors (Rogers, 1975).
According to Rogers (1975), there are three cognitive appraisal processes: severity of
threat, probability of threat occurrence, and belief of coping behavior efficacy in
mitigating threat. In 1983, Rogers revised PMT by incorporating self-efficacy
expectancy. The outcome of these cognitive appraisal processes is called protection
motivation.
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Psychological ownership, on the other hand, is formed by individuals’ developed
feelings of ownership as a part of effective and cognitive thought processes, which makes
strong emotional relations between the individual and object (Pierce et al., 2003). Pierce
et al. (2001) proposed that psychological ownership emerged to satisfy human motives
and suggested that psychological ownership is rooted in three main motives: self-identity,
control, and having a place. When the individual feels a high level of psychological
ownership towards people, assets, and organization, the individual acts as an extension of
owner identity, experiences a high degree of control of the target, and has a high sense of
place as his or hers.
PMT, GDT, and psychological ownership theory have been widely applied in IS
studies. For example, GDT is a prominent theoretical foundation of employees’ misuse of
IS resources (D'Arcy et al., 2009; D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Willison et al., 2018) and
employees’ security policy compliance and non-compliance (Chen et al., 2012; Kuo et
al., 2017; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Additionally, PMT is a widely used motivation
theory that explains and influences users’ protection motivation behaviors in different
fields such as IS security. Boss et al. (2015) as well as Posey et al. (2015) utilized PMT
based on threat appraisal (perceived severity threat, perceived vulnerability threat, &
maladaptive rewards), and coping appraisal (self- efficacy, response efficacy, & response
cost) to examine how they influence individuals’ security behaviors in order to mitigate
threat. Moreover, psychological ownership theory has been employed for understanding
employees’ behaviors by explaining employees’ perception of ownership of their
organization (Menard et al., 2018). Therefore, it is a rationale for leveraging GDT, PMT,
and psychological ownership theory’s constructs to predict and understand employees’
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motivation in complying with password policies since they have explained IS security
behaviors successfully. The integration of these grounded theories’ constructs also leads
to develop more powerful and suitable model that explain employees’ intention to
comply with password policies.
Based on the literature, factors that influence employees’ intention to comply with
password policies and its relation to the actual compliance are not explained sufficiently.
The researcher attempted to bridge the gap by proposing a theoretical model useing PMT,
GDT, and psychological ownership theory to examine employee’s intention to comply
with password policies and to extend the model using TRA to associate employees’
intention to comply with password policies with the actual compliance behaviors. TRA
was developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), and it predicts how individuals behave
based on their intentions, where intention is affected by individuals’ attitudes toward the
behaviors and subjective norm. In 1991, TRA was extended by adding behavioral control
to the model by Ajzen to develop TPB. According to Ajzen (991), intentions capture the
influence of motivation and willingness to perform a specific behavior.
To accomplish, this study integrated the construct of (perceived vulnerability
threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, perceived psychological ownership,
intention to comply with password policies, & actual compliance) into one model to
understand what motivates employees’ password policies compliance. The model
represents the relationship between the independent variables (perceived vulnerability
threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, & perceived psychological ownership)
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and the mediating variable (intention to comply with password policies) as well as the
relationship between the mediating variable and the dependent variable (the actual
compliance with password policies). Figure 1 illustrates the proposed theoretical model.
Figure 1
Proposed Theoretical Model
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Hypotheses
The constructs in this quantitative cross-sectional study were leveraged and
identified based on the theoretical foundation. PMT constructs are perceived vulnerability
threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. The
threat appraisal component of PMT is presented as perceived vulnerability threat and
perceived severity threat, whereas coping appraisal component of PMT is presented as
response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. GDT constructs are perceived severity
sanction and perceived certainty sanction. Perceived psychological ownership construct is
also used, which is based on psychological ownership theory. Each construct is defined
below, and all hypotheses were proposed based on previous studies’ findings.
Perceived Vulnerability Threat
Zhang and McDowell (2009) stated that “perceived vulnerability concerns the
susceptibility a person has to a threat” (p. 185). Weak passwords can be compromised by
dictionary attack techniques, which try all the possible password combinations
(Chakrabarti & Singha, 2007). Written passwords can be accessible by unauthorized
persons (Lo, 2016). In addition, passwords can be guessed by learning others’ personal
information such as pets’ names and birthdays (Micallef & Arachchilage, 2017).
Individuals who perceive a high degree of password vulnerability will be more concerned
with protection motivation behavior to protect passwords (Zhang & McDowell, 2009).
Many studies have associated perceived vulnerability threat with protection
motivation behaviors. For example, Ifinedo (2012) found that perceived vulnerability
positively predicts the intention to comply with IS policies among business managers and
IS professionals. Similarly, Siponen et al. (2014) utilized PMT to explain the adherence
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of employees to IS policies and found that perceived vulnerability predicts employees’
intention to comply with IS policy. On the other hand, other researchers revealed that
perceived vulnerability is not related to the intention to comply with password guidelines
(Mwagwabi et al., 2014; Mwagwabi, 2015) or students’ intention to change passwords
(Kusyanti & Sari, 2017). Mwagwabi et al. (2018) as well as Mwagwabi (2015) failed to
explain why perceived vulnerability is not related to compliance with password
guidelines among Internet users and suggested that perceived vulnerability differs in
personal and organizational settings. Hence, the hypothesis is:
H1a: Perceived vulnerability threat is positively related to employees’ intention to
comply with password policies.
Perceived Severity Threat
Zhang and McDowell (2009) stated that “perceived severity assesses how severe
a person believes a threat will be to his or her life” (p. 184). Password breaches can lead
to data exposure to hackers or public, and financial losses; therefore, when individuals
perceived a high threat severity, they will be more motivated to perform protection
motivation acts to protect their password from being compromised (Zhang & McDowell,
2009).
Previous studies have associated perceived severity threat with protection
motivation behaviors. Ifinedo (2012) found that perceived severity did not predict
intention to comply with IS policies among business managers and IS professionals.
Likewise, in 2015, Posey et al. assessed the motivation of insiders’ security behaviors in
organizational using PMT and found that threat severity was insignificantly related to
protection motivation. On the other hand, in 2014, Siponen et al. utilized PMT to explain
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the adherence of employees to IS policies and found that perceived severity positively
affects employee’s intention to comply with IS policy. Additionally, Mwagwabi et al.
(2014) as well as Mwagwabi (2015) found that perceived threat influences Internet users’
intentions to comply with password guidelines. Although there is a contradiction in
findings among studies, Zhang and McDowell (2009) asserted that the more the
individuals perceived severity of threat, the more they will perform the recommended
action to mitigate the threat. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:
H1b: Perceived severity threat is positively related to employees’ intention to
comply with password policies.
Response Efficacy
Rogers (1983) defined response efficacy as the effectiveness of coping responses
in preventing the threat. In addition, Herath and Rao (2009) defined response efficacy as
“beliefs about whether the recommended coping response will be effective in reducing
the threat” (p. 111). Similarly, Zhang and McDowell (2009) stated that “response
efficacy evaluates how effective the recommended coping response is in reducing the
threat” (p. 187). Floyd et al. (2000) asserted that response efficacy increases the
possibility of performing an adaptive response.
Many studies have associated response efficacy with protection motivation
behaviors. For example, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) examined the effect of fear
appeals on university subject’s compliance with computer security actions that mitigate
threats of spyware. They found that response efficacy positively impacts users’ intention
to comply with the recommended security actions. Posey et al. (2015) examined the
effect of employees’ commitments on their motivation to protect organizational
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information assets, and they found that response efficacy was positively related to their
protection motivation behaviors. Ifinedo (2012) asserted that response efficacy positively
predicts the intention to comply with IS policies among business manages and IS
professionals. Moreover, Mwagwabi (2015) as well as Mwagwabi et al. (2014) revealed
that perceived password effectiveness influences the intentions to comply with password
guidelines. Likewise, Kusyanti and Sari (2017) showed that response efficacy influences
students’ intention to change passwords. Thus, the hypothesis is:
H1c: Response efficacy is positively related to employees’ intention to comply
with password policies.
Self-efficacy
Rogers (1983) defined self-efficacy as “the ability to perform the coping
response” (p. 170). Herath and Rao (2009) defined self-efficacy as “one’s ability to
perform a task” (p. 111). Posey et al. (2015) defined self-efficacy as “the belief that an
individual is personally capable of implementing the proposed coping strategy
appropriately” (p. 15). In addition, Maddux and Rogers (1983) defined self- efficacy
expectancy as “person’s belief that he or she is or is not capable of performing the
requisite behavior” (p. 471). Additionally, Floyd et al. (2000) asserted that self-efficacy
increases the possibility of performing the adaptive response.
Previous studies contended that self-efficacy predicts protection motivation
behaviors. For example, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) found that self-efficacy
positively impacts users’ intention to comply with the recommended security actions.
Ifinedo (2012) revealed that self-efficacy positively influences intention to comply with
IS policies. In addition, many researchers asserted that self-efficacy is positively related
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to employees’ intentions to comply with password policies (Anye, 2019) and to Internet
users’ intention to comply with password guidelines (Mwagwabi, 2015; Mwagwabi et al.,
2014). Thus, the developed hypothesis is:
H1d: Self-efficacy is positively related to employee's intention to comply with
password policies.
Response Cost
Herath and Rao (2009) defined response cost as “beliefs about how costly
performing the recommended response will be” (p. 111). Zhang and McDowell (2009)
defined response cost as “a factor in the coping-appraisal process, measures the perceived
costs (e.g., time, money, effort) that a person has to pay in taking the protective behavior”
(p. 186). For example, time and effort spent to create a strong password, update the
previous passwords, and retrieve the forgotten password are barriers that prevent
individuals from performing recommended actions (Zhang & McDowell, 2009).
According to Kusyanti and Sari (2017), users minimize the cost of response by using the
same password for different accounts. In addition, Floyd et al. (2000) asserted that
response costs decrease the possibility of performing the adaptive response.
In 2012, Ifinedo asserted that the proposition that response cost is negatively
associated with the intention to comply with IS policies was not supported. However,
Posey et al. (2015) negatively associated response costs with employees’ protection
motivation behaviors that protect organizational information assets. Additionally,
Kusyanti and Sari (2017) found that response cost negatively influences students’
intention to change passwords. Accordingly, the hypothesis is:
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H1e: Response cost is negatively related to employees’ intention to comply with
password policies.
Perceived Severity Sanction and Perceived Certainty Sanction
D’Arcy et al. (2009) defined severity sanction as a “degree of punishment” and
certainty sanction as a “probability of being punished” (p. 83). However, Siponen et al.
(2010) referred certainty to “the extent to which an individual believes that criminal
behavior will be detected”, while severity referred to “how harshly it will be punished”
(p. 69). D’Arcy and Herath (2011) asserted that certain, severe, and swift sanctions can
control users’ illicit behaviors at the workplace. Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) found that
perceived severity of punishment is negatively related to illicit behavior only when the
perceived certainty is high. In 2009, D'Arcy et al. found that perceived severity of formal
sanction is more effective than certainty sanction in deterring IS misuse. In addition,
D'Arcy and Devaraj (2012) revealed that the threat of formal sanction has direct and
indirect effects on IT resources misuse intention.
Previous studies asserted that sanctions also influence employees’ security policy
compliance. For example, Herath and Rao (2009) examined the influence of perception
of sanctions on employees’ intention to comply with IS policies and found that perceived
certainty of sanction has a positive impact on intention to comply with policy, but not
perceived severity sanction. Chen et al. (2012) conducted an experimental study to
examine the combined effects of reward and punishment on enforcing security policy
compliance. They found that the effects of reward, severity of punishment, and certainty
of control are significant in enforcing security policies. In addition, in 2017, Kuo et al.
conducted a correlational study to understand the effects of that deterrence on Electronic
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Medical Record (EMR) privacy policy compliance among nurses. They showed that the
formal sanctions and informal sanctions were effective in deterring nurses from violating
EMR. Therefore, the hypotheses are:
H1f: Perceived severity sanction of noncompliance is positively related to
employees’ intention to comply with password policies.
H1g: Perceived certainty sanction of noncompliance is positively related to
employees’ intention to comply with password policies.
Perceived Psychological Ownership
Psychological ownership is formed when an individual develops feelings of
ownership toward an object, which makes strong relations between the individual and
that object (Pierce et al., 2003). Menard et al. (2018) extended previous studies based on
PMT by showing the impact of psychological ownership and cultural difference. Menard
et al. (2018) found that collectivism negatively affects psychological ownership and
positively affects the intention not to protect information, whereas psychological
ownership negatively affects the intention not to protect information. In 2018, Yoo et al.
revealed that psychological ownership has a significant impact on security compliance
intention and suggested utilizing psychological ownership to promote employees' security
compliance intention. Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) found a positive association between
psychological ownership, organizational behaviors, and employees’ attitudes. In addition,
Kim and Beehr (2017) asserted that psychological ownership is negatively related to
work-place deviant behaviors. Yoo et al. (2018) argued that having a feeling of
ownership toward the organizational information assets makes employees identify
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themselves in the organization, aware of protecting organizational information, and
motivate toward security compliance. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:
H1h: Perceived psychological ownership of the organizational account is
positively related to employees’ intention to comply with password policies.
Intention to Comply with Password Policies
Intention is defined as the motivation that influences a specific behavior and the
willingness to put effort in order to perform it (Ajzen, 1991). Ajzen asserted that the
stronger the intention to perform a specific behavior, the more it is likely to perform that
behavior. In 2015, Mwagwabi found that intention to comply and actual password
compliance are positively associated but not strong. Mwagwabi believed that there was
no strong relationship between intention to comply and the actual behaviors because the
passwords were just for the survey, which did not reflect their actual behaviors. In
addition, Thompson et al. (2017) as well as Giwah (2019) found a weak relationship
between intention and actual mobile device usage. On the other hand, Lau (2020) found a
significant positive effect of intention on actual mobile device usage. Siponen et al.
(2014) also found that the intention to comply with IS policies is related to the actual
compliance. In addition, Boss et al. (2015) implied that intention is related to the actual
security behaviors. Thus, the hypothesis is:
H2: Employees’ intention to comply with password policies is positively related
to their actual compliance with the password policies.
Past Literature and Identification of Gaps
Although most of the studies have focused on IS policy compliance and security
behaviors in general (Blythe et al., 2015; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin,
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2010; Posey et al., 2015; Sommestad et al., 2015), few studies have examined specifically
what factors influence password policies compliance in organizational settings (Anye,
2019; Choong & Theofanos, 2015). Therefore, these factors are still unknown and need
further investigation. Based on reviewing past literature, perceived vulnerability threat,
perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, and perceived psychological ownership
were considered to examine what factors influence employees’ compliance with
password policies. In addition, this study addressed the scarcity of actual compliance
usage as a dependent variable, which creates a gap in IS security literature.
In 2017, Kusyanti and Sari analyzed students’ intention toward changing
passwords for Student Academic Information Systems (SAIS) application by adopting
PMT constructs, which are perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy,
response cost, and fear. They found that the factors that influence students’ intention to
change passwords are perceived severity, response efficacy, response cost, and fear but
not perceived vulnerability. In addition, Mwagwabi et al. (2014) investigated how
Internet users’ perceptions of password and security threats influence their intention to
comply with password guidelines based on PMT and how these perceptions can be
manipulated using fear appeals to improve password guidelines compliance. Mwagwabi
et al. found that perceived threat, self-efficacy, and perceived password effectiveness
influence the intentions to follow password guidelines but not perceived vulnerability,
which support the findings of Kusyanti and Sari (2017) and contradict the findings of
other studies (Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen et al., 2014).
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Ifinedo (2012) found that perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy,
objective norm, and attitude toward compliance positively predict the intention to comply
with IS policies among business managers and IS professionals, but not perceived
severity and response cost. Moreover, Siponen et al. (2014) utilized PMT, TRA, and
Cognitive Evaluation Theory to explain the adherence of employees to IS policies and
found that perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, attitude toward IS policy
compliance, employees’ belief that they can adhere to IS policy, and social norm toward
complying with IS policies positively affect employees’ intention to comply with IS
policies. Mwagwabi et al. (2014) suggested that future research compare the intention to
comply between users who have been impacted and have not been impacted by hacking
to understand the link between perceived vulnerability and user’s intention to comply
with password guidelines.
In 2015, Mwagwabi found that: (a) there is no association between perceived
vulnerability threat and users’ intention to comply with password guidelines among users
who have been impacted by hacking, (b) intention to comply and the actual password
compliance are positively associated but not strong, and (c) fear appeals used in this
study had no long-term effect on intention to comply with password guidelines.
Mwagwabi recommended future research could examine the relationship between the
intention to comply with password guidelines and the actual password guidelines
compliance and what contributes to the weak prediction of actual behaviors. Mwagwabi’s
2015 study showed that there is no link between perceived vulnerability and intention to
comply with password guidelines in the personal account setting, while Ifinedo (2012) as
well as Siponen et al. (2014) found a link between perceived vulnerability threat and the
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intention to comply with IS policies in the organizational setting. Therefore, the reason
for the discrepancy in findings could be the differences in setting as well as the
differences in IS context.
Compliance is different between Internet users and employees since users protect
their personal information assets while employees protect the organizational assets
(Mwagwabi et al., 2018). Perceived psychological ownership explains employees’
perception of ownership of their organizations (Menard et al., 2018). In 2018, Menard et
al. extended previous studies that are based on PMT by showing the impact of
psychological ownership and culture on intention not to protect information. Menard et
al. found that collectivism negatively affects psychological ownership and positively
affect the intention not to protect information; on the other hand, psychological
ownership negatively affects intention not to protect information. Menard et al. (2018)
recommended examining the impact of psychological ownership on different types of
security behaviors because increasing perceived psychological ownership of the
information within an organization might be an optimal practice to foster a secure
environment. Therefore, considering users’ psychological ownership of the information
in future research is needed because it would influence the intention to comply with
password policies requirements.
Anye (2019) conducted a quantitative correlational study to examine the
relationship between employees’ attitudes toward password policies, self-efficacy,
information security awareness, and employee intentions to comply with password
policies in different business sectors, based on TPB and Social Cognitive Theory. Anye
found that both attitudes toward password policies and self-efficacy were significantly
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related to employees’ intentions to comply with password policies. Anye recommended
future research to examine other factors, such as threat appraisal, sanctions, and how
these factors affect users’ intentions to comply with password policies. D’Arcy et al.
(2009) as well as D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) asserted that severity and certainty
sanctions have significant effects on deterring employees’ misuse of IS resources. The
limitation of Anye’s 2019 study was that all participants were highly aware of IS policies,
which might affect their intentions to comply with password policies. In addition, Anye
examined the intention to comply with password policies but not the actual compliance.
To conclude, many gaps in literature exist that need further research regarding
factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies. A few studies have
specifically explored what factors influence employees’ password policies compliance.
Mwagwabi et al. (2014) as well as Mwagwabi (2015) focused on Internet users, when
they login to their e-mail accounts, to examine the effect of fear appeals in complying
with password guidelines. Mwagwabi (2015) recommended future research to examine
fear appeals in organizational settings, where users may behave differently. Mwagwabi
(2015) as well as Mwagwabi et al. (2018) also confirmed that there is a lack of password
research that links the intention to comply with the actual compliance behaviors, and
there is a need for more studies to determine how intention predicts actual security
behaviors. Additionally, Anye (2019) recommended future research to expand the
findings by examining the influence of sanctions and threat appraisal on password
policies compliance based on PMT and GDT. Furthermore, Menard et al. (2018)
recommended examining the influence of psychological ownership on different types of
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security behaviors because increasing perceived psychological ownership would foster
secure behaviors.
Analysis of the Research Methods Used
Many studies in IS field that utilized PMT, GDT, TRA, and psychological
ownership theory were reviewed in order to determine the research method of this study.
Based on the methodologies of the reviewed studies., survey research was the most
utilized research method. For example, Anye (2019) conducted a correlational study to
examine the relationship between employees’ attitudes towards password policies and
their intentions to comply with password policies using an Internet-based survey. In
2009, D’Arcy et al. conducted an empirical study on 269 computer users using a survey
instrument to investigate the influence of perceived severity and certainty sanctions on
reducing individuals’ intentions to misuse IS resources. Similarly, Hovav and D’Arcy
(2012) conducted an empirical study to examine if increasing perceived severity and
certainty sanctions would affect the security countermeasures effectiveness in deterring
IS misuse behaviors based on national cultures. The sample consisted of 366 participants
from the United States and 360 participants from Korea, and the data were collected
using survey instrument. In addition, Menard et al. (2018) extended previous studied that
are based on PMT by showing the impact of psychological ownership and cultures. The
sample consisted of 439 participants, and the data were collected using survey
instrument.
Almost all the reviewed studies assessed different types of validity, such as
content, construct, and discriminant validity along with the reliability of constructs.
Additionally, most of the reviewed studies used a cross-sectional method in collecting
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data. Descriptive and inferential statistics were also used in most of the reviewed studies.
Univariate descriptive statistics were used to calculate measures of central tendency and
variability, whereas inferential statistics were used to infer the outcomes, test the
hypotheses, and describe the relationships between variables.
Synthesis of the Literature
The developed theoretical foundation is based on PMT, GDT, TRA, and
psychological ownership theory. PMT was developed by Rogers (1975, 1983) to explain
fear appeals in health field. GDT was developed in 1975 by Gibbs to explain the effect of
sanction on preventing criminal acts. In addition, psychological ownership theory was
developed by Furby (1978) and posits that individuals’ feelings of ownership motivate
them to perform behaviors to maintain the sense of self-identity, power, and security.
Additionally, TRA was developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), and it predicts how
individuals behave based on their intentions.
Reviewing the literature revealed that many studies were conducted on
individuals’ behaviors in different IS contexts (Blythe et al., 2015; Herath & Rao, 2009;
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Posey et al., 2015; Sommestad et al., 2015). However, few
studies have been done specifically to predict employees’ behaviors in complying with
password policies (Anye, 2019; Choong & Theofanos, 2015). Anye (2019) as well as
Choong and Theofanos (2015) examined the relationship between the attitudes toward
password policies and employees’ intentions to comply with password policies. Anye
(2019) recommended future research to examine other factors, such as threat appraisal
and sanctions. In addition, Menard et al. (2018) suggested examining psychological
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ownership construct on different security behaviors to promote practices that foster
secure behaviors.
This study utilized existing constructs from PMT, GDT, and psychological
ownership theory to determine other factors that influence employees’ intention to
comply with password policies. The utilized constructs were perceived vulnerability
threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, and perceived psychological ownership.
In addition, although a few studies have been conducted to examine the relationship
between intention and actual behaviors in different IS contexts (Boss et al., 2015; Giwah,
2019; Lau, 2020; Liang & Xue, 2010; Siponen et al., 2014), there is a lack of password
research that addresses actual password compliance behaviors, which creates a gap in the
literature (Mwagwabi, 2015; Mwagwabi et al., 2018). Therefore. this study also utilized
TRA to link intention to comply with actual password compliance.
Summary
This chapter synthesized literature based on previous studies in IS security
behaviors. The literature review explored different theories to develop the theoretical
foundation of this study, which is based on PMT, GDT,TRA, and psychological
ownership theory attempting to understand how to utilize their constructs in this study:
perceived vulnerability threat, perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy,
response cost, perceived severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, and perceived
psychological ownership, which leads to intention to comply with password policies as
well as the actual compliance. Not only theories in the previous studies were reviewed,
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but also the findings, the gaps, and the methodologies in order to add to the knowledge by
determining factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview of Research Design
A quantitative cross-sectional study was conducted using a survey strategy to
examine what factors influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
Furthermore, this method was used to collect and analyze the numerical data in order to
test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. Quantitative research has its
philosophical underpinnings in the positivist school of thoughts. Ontologically,
positivism claims that there is only one reality in the universe, and it is the researcher’s
duty to find the truth (Creswell, 2013). Additionally, the epistemology for this paradigm
is based on objectivism where knowledge is generated objectively by the interaction with
objects of the universe (Creswell, 2013). Nonetheless, this study aimed to reveal
employees’ password policies compliance by examining the relationship as well as the
predictions between the constructs using a quantitative cross-sectional approach.
Incidentally, the relationship between variables is associative in nature and does not mean
causality (Polit & Beck, 2008). This methodology chapter discusses the research method,
instrumentation, population and sample, data analysis, format for presenting the results,
and resource requirements.
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Specific Research Method
To address the research problem, a theoretical model based on PMT (Rogers,
1975, 1983), GDT (Gibbs, 1975), and psychological ownership theory (Furby, 1978) was
developed to explain employees’ compliance with password policies. A quantitative
cross-sectional design was used to assess the relationship between the construct of
perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, perceived response efficacy, selfefficacy, perceived response cost, perceived severity sanction, perceived certainty
sanction, perceived psychological ownership, and intention to comply with password
policies, as well as the relationship between the intention to comply with password
policies and the actual compliance with password policies. The survey is an effective
strategy to collect data for testing the aforementioned relationships.
This quantitative cross-sectional study was conducted in a non-contrived setting
without interference. The unit of analysis is individuals since the data was collected from
each employee. Data was collected using an adapted Likert rating scale survey instrument
to determine factors that contribute to employees’ compliance with password policies.
The adapted survey collected data for each construct as well as demographics data, such
as gender, age, and educational level. The participation letter along with the survey
instrument that addresses all variables and demographics questionnaire sent to the
participants. Surveys are easy to administer, inexpensive, accessible, convenient, but
have a low response rate (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). Thus, to increase the response rate, a
monetary incentive technique was used.
To ensure the validity and reliability of the survey instrument, the instrument was
reviewed through a Delphi study and by an expert panel that is knowledgeable in IS

38
discipline. The reviewed instrument was then pilot tested using a small group of
participants before starting actual data collection. Straub (1989) implied that the
reliability and content validity of the instrument can be enhanced by a pilot test and
expert panel review, respectively. Skulmoski et al. (2007) identified the Delphi method as
“an iterative process used to collect and distill the judgments of experts using a series of
questionnaires interspersed with feedback” (p. 2). Additionally, Hertzog (2008) suggested
that when conducting a pilot study, a sample size of 10 to 40 participants would be
sufficient. Based on the pilot and Delphi study’s feedback, the instrument was revised.
Instrumentation
Instrument Development
For developing a survey instrument in this study, only the items with composite
reliability or Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.70 and above were adapted from previous
validated studies. According to Straub (1989), adapting instrument by making a major
change to the valid instrument without retesting it weakens the validity of the adapted
instrument. Therefore, the adapted items were changed slightly. For example, “IS
policies” was replaced by “password policies” as presented in Table 1.
For collecting data, a 7-point Likert scale survey instrument ranging from 1=
Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree was developed (see Appendix A). The level of
measurement used is an interval scale for measuring all survey items, which ensures
distance equality. After developing the instrument, the instrument internal consistency
was tested based on Cronbach’s alpha. Sekaran and Bougie (2012) implied that reliability
less than 0.6 is considered poor, in the range of 0.7 is acceptable, and above 0.8 is good.
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For this study, the acceptance coefficient of Cronbach’s alpha was 0.7 and above. In
addition, the content validity of the instrument was tested by conducting Delphi study.
Table 1
Constructs, Adapted Items, and Sources
Perceived Vulnerability Threat
PV1
PV2
PV3
PV4

PS1
PS2
PS3
PS4
PS5
PS6

SE1
SE2
SE3

RE1
RE2
RE3

I know my organizational password could be vulnerable to
security breaches if I don’t adhere to password policies.
I could fall victim to password attacks if I fail to comply
with my organizational password policies.
I believe that trying to protect my organizational password
will reduce illegal access to it.
My organizational password may be compromised if I
don’t pay adequate attention to policies.
Perceived Severity Threat
A security breach on my account would be a serious
problem for me.
Loss of information resulting from compromising
password would be a serious problem for me.
Having my account accessed by someone without my
consent or knowledge would be a serious problem for me.
Having someone successfully attack my account would be
very problematic for me.
I view password security attacks as harmful.
I believe that protecting my organizational password is
important.
Self-Efficacy
I have the necessary skills to fulfill the requirements of
password policies.
I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the requirements
of password policies.
I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the
requirements of password policies.
Response Efficacy
My efforts to keep my organizational password safe from
information security threats are effective.
Password policies that can be taken by employees to
protect their organizational passwords are effective.
The preventive measures available to me are adequate to
prevent others from accessing my organizational password.
Response Cost

Ifinedo (2012)

Adopted from
Ifinedo (2012),
Woon et al.
(2005), and
Workman et al.
(2008) cited in
McGill and
Thompson
(2018).

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010).

Adopted from
Workman et al.
(2008) cited in
Posey et al.
(2015).
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Table 1(continued)
Constructs, Adapted Items, and Sources
RC1
RC2
RC3

PSS1
PSS2
PSS3

PCS1
PCS2
PCS3
PPO1
PPO2
PPO3

IC1
IC2
IC3

AC1
AC2
AC3

Complying with the requirements of password policies is
time consuming for me.
Complying with the requirements of password policies is
burdensome for me.
Complying with the requirements of password policies is
costly for me.
Perceived Severity Sanction
The organization disciplines employees who break
password policies.
My organization terminates employees who repeatedly
break password policies.
If I were caught violating my organization password
policies, I would be severely punished.
Perceived Certainty Sanction
If I don’t follow password policies, I will be punished.
If I violate password policies, the probability that I would
be caught is:
If I violate password policies, I would be probably caught.
Perceived Psychological Ownership
This is my organizational account.
I feel a high degree of personal ownership of my
organizational account.
I sense that my organizational account is mine.
Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation)
I intend to comply with the requirements of my
organization’s password policies.
I intend to protect my organizational password according to
the requirements of my organization’s password policies.
I intend to carry out my responsibility prescribed in my
organization’s password policies to protect my
organizational password.
Actual Compliance with Password Policies
I adhere to the password policies that exist at my
organization.
To the best of my knowledge, I do not violate password
policies that exist at my organization.
I believe that I currently work entirely in accordance with
the password policies that exist at my organization.

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

Herath and Rao
(2009)

Siponen et al.
(2010).
Peace et al.
(2003)

Yoo et al.
(2018).

Ajzen (1991)
cited in
Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

Sommestad et
al. (2015)
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Instrument Reliability
The reliability of an instrument is defined as “an indication of the stability and
consistency with which the instrument measures the concept and helps to assess the
“goodness” of a measure” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012, p. 223). The stability of measures
refers to “the ability of a measure to remain the same over time”. In addition, consistency
of measures refers to “the homogeneity of the items” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012, p. 224).
To increase the reliability of the instrument, the items for this study were adapted from
previous studies that tested the reliability of the items, which should be above 0.07.
According to McNeish (2017), the values of composite reliability and Cronbach’s alpha
that are above 0.7 are considered acceptable. This study confirmed each reliability score
is not less than 0.7.
This survey includes the following 10 major items: (a) perceived vulnerability
threat, (b) perceived severity threat, (c) perceived response efficacy, (d) self-efficacy, (e)
perceived response cost, (f) perceived severity sanction of noncompliance, (g) perceived
certainty sanction of noncompliance, (h) perceived psychological ownership to the
organizational account, (i) intention to comply with password policies, and (j) actual
compliance with password policies.
As seen in Table 1 above and Table 2 below, to measure perceived psychological
ownership, items were adapted from Yoo et al. (2018). These items were measured on a
5-point Likert scale. The reliability test of the perceived psychological ownership items
was 0.93. Furthermore, items for actual compliance with password policies were
measured using 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Improbability to 7 = Probability,
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and from 1 = False to 7 = True. The reliability measure of actual compliance items was a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 (Sommestad et al., 2015).
According to Ifinedo (2012), the composite reliability of perceived threat
vulnerability items was 0.93. These items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree. Additionally, based on McGill
and Thompson (2018), the Cronbach alpha value of perceived threat severity items was
above 0.90. Perceived threat severity’s items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale
from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree.
The items for intention to comply with password policies were measured on a 7point Likert scale from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree. The items for
response cost were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = Not at All to 7 = Very
Much. In addition, the items for self-efficacy were measured on a 7-point Likert scale as
1 = Almost Never; 2=Very Rarely; 3= Rarely; 4= Occasionally; 5= Frequently; 6=Very
Frequently; 7= Almost Always. The reliability test for these items had a composite
reliability of 0.982 for self-efficacy, 0.948 for response cost, and 0.984 for intention to
comply with password policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Moreover, the items for response
efficacy were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 =
Strongly Agree. The reliability of the response efficacy items was a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.85 (Posey et al., 2015).
The items for perceived severity sanction were measured using a 7-point Likert
scale from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree. The reliability measure of
perceived severity sanction items was a composite reliability of 0.88 (Herath &Rao,
2009). In addition, the items for perceived certainty sanction were measured using a 5-
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point Likert scale from 1 = Very Low to 5 = Very High, and from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5
= Strongly Disagree. The reliability measure of perceived certainty sanction items was a
composite reliability of 0.92 (Peace et al., 2003), and Cronbach’s alpha > 0.6 (Siponen et
al., 2010).
Table 2
Reliability of the Original Items
Constructs

Number Original reliability
of Items

Perceived
vulnerability threat

4

Perceived severity
threat

6

Self- efficacy

3

Composite reliability = 0.93
(Ifinedo, 2012).
Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.90.
(McGrill &Thompson, 2018).
Composite reliability =0.982
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010).

Response efficacy

3

Cronbach’s alpha= 0.85
(Posey et al., 2015).

Response cost

3

Composite reliability=0.948
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010).

Perceived severity
sanction

3

Composite reliability= 0.88
(Herath & Rao, 2009).

Perceived certainty 3
sanction

Cronbach’s alpha > 0.6 (Siponen et al.,
2010),
Composite reliability = 0.92 (Peace et al.,
2003).

Perceived
psychological
ownership

3

Intention to
comply

3

Actual compliance

3

Composite reliability=0.93
(Yoo et al., 2018).
Composite reliability =0.984
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
Cronbach’s alpha=0.82
(Sommestad et al., 2015).
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Instrument Validity
To ensure valid results, not only reliability but also the validity of the instrument
was assessed. Sekaran and Bougie (2012) asserted that to ensure scientific research, a
valid and reliable instrument is needed. Validity refers to “a test of how well an
instrument that is developed measures the particular concept it is intended to measure”
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2012, p. 220). There are different types of validity, such as content
validity and construct validity. Content validity assesses whether the contents of the
questionnaire reflect the content domain being measured. Construct validity, assessing
through discriminant and convergent validity, refers to the degree to which a theoretical
construct is measured by the instrument (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). Hair, Hult, et al.
(2014) defined convergent validity as “the extent to which a measure correlates positively
with alternative measures of the same construct” (p. 102). According to Hair, Sarstedt, et
al. (2014), convergent validity is supported when the outer loadings of each item is above
0.70, and the average variance extracted (AVE) value of each construct is 0.50 or higher.
The AVE value of 0.50 means that the construct explains at least half of its indicators’
variance.
Additionally, Hair, Sarstedt, et al. (2014) defined discriminant validity as “the
extent to which the construct is empirically distinct from other constructs” (p. 112). To
measure the discriminant validity of the indicators, cross loadings method is used, which
requires that the loadings of each construct’s indicator should be higher than all other
constructs’ cross loadings (Henseler et al., 2009). Another method is Fornell- Larcker
criterion, which notes that the construct shares with its indicators more variance than any
other construct. To meet this criterion, every construct’s AVE should be higher than any
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other construct’s highest squared correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). In this study,
Fornell- Larcker criterion was used to examine the discriminant validity.
To increase content validity, the questionnaire for the aforementioned dimensions
(perceived vulnerability threat, perceived severity threat, perceived response efficacy,
self-efficacy, perceived response cost, perceived severity sanction, perceived certainty
sanction, perceived psychological ownership, intention to comply with password policies,
& the actual compliance with password policies) was adapted and adopted. According to
Straub et al. (2004), adopting questions from previous studies increases content validity.
Moreover, to confirm the reliability and validity of the adapted instrument, a pilot and
Delphi studies were conducted.
Threats to validity can be internal or external. Many factors affect the validity of
studies, such as history, maturation, selection, morality, regression, instrumentation, and
testing (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). To address the history, morality, and maturation
threats, the data was collected at one point in time to avoid changing over time. In
addition, instrumentation threat was not an issue since the same instrument was used to
collect data from all participants. According to Torre and Picho (2016), internal validity
applies to experimental studies where the dependent variable is affected by the
manipulated independent variables. In addition, Sekaran and Bougie (2012) stated that
internal validity determines if there are other extraneous factors that cause the effects.
This study is not experimental; therefore, there is no issue with internal validity threats,
such as testing effect. Moreover, to mitigate the external validity threat, this study
ensured a sufficient sample size using G* power analysis. Torre and Picho (2016) implied
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that external validity affects the generalizability’s degree of results. However, the sample
of this study is a convenience sample, which is not generalizable.
Population and Sample
Based on the objective of the study and the characteristics of the population, the
sample is identified (Terrell, 2015). The target population is all employees who use a
password to log in to the organizational accounts and have password policies to comply
with. The sample, which is a subset of the population, was all participants who were
willing to participate in this study by completing the survey.
There are two different types of sampling: probability and non-probability
samplings. In probability sampling, each element has an equal probability to be selected
as a subject in the study, which is expensive, generalizable, and less bias. For example,
sample random sampling, cluster sampling, systematic sampling, area sampling, stratified
sampling, and double sampling. On the other hand, in non-probability sampling, the
element has an unequal probability to be selected, which means the findings cannot be
generalized to the population. For example, purposive and convenience sampling
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2012).
For this study, a non-probability convenience sample was used to gather data
from employees who are conveniently accessible. The researcher utilized a market
research company (MTurk) to recruit participants, send surveys, and gain access to the
sample. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2012), convenience sample is a good choice
to obtain information conveniently, quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. Hence, a
convenient choice of sampling was an instrumental choice in examining what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
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For this study, G*Power 3.1 analysis was used to obtain an adequate sample size.
G*Power 3.1 is a software that can estimate the sample size based on alpha level (α),
power level (1-β), and effect size (Faul et al., 2007). For multiple regression analysis, an
estimated sample size of 100 participants was determined using a significance level (α =
0.05), power (1-β) of 0.80, a medium effect size (f2) of 0.15, and eight predictor variables.
Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Before analyzing data, raw data were coded and edited. The outliers and
inconsistent responses were reviewed and addressed to prepare for data analysis. Preanalysis data screening is essential to confirm data accuracy and consequently to increase
results validity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). In this study, to ensure coding accuracy,
electronic survey was used, which directly enters the key of responses into the computer.
In addition, before the analysis of data, all fundamental data were examined for normal
distribution and homogeneity of variance to ensure the absence of any outliers. Outlier
responses were investigated by the scatterplot method using the Statistical Package for
the Social Science (SPSS) software. Based on Sekaran and Bougie (2012), the researcher
can edit or omit the outlier and inconsistent responses, ignore the blank responses, and
not include the questionnaire in data analysis if approximately 25% of the items are not
answered.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive
statistics involve central tendency and dispersion of demographics questionnaire. Central
tendency is the mode, median, and mean, while dispersion is the range, variance, standard
deviation, and interquartile range (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). SPSS software was used for
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data screening and descriptive analysis. In addition, the multiple regression method was
used to infer the outcomes, test the hypotheses, and describe the relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent variable. Constantin (2017) asserted that when
the model involves more than two independent variables that predict one dependent
variable, the multiple regression method is used. For conducting multiple regression
analysis, SmartPLS 3.0 software was used.
To test the hypotheses of this study and to run a regression analysis, a partial least
square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) approach was used. PLS-SEM can be
used as a regression tool to examine the relationships between latent variables in the
structural model as well as the relationship between the latent variable and its indicators
in the measurement model (Chin et al., 2003).
There are two different approaches to structural equation modeling (SEM). One
approach is covariance-based (CB-SEM) and another one is PLS-SEM. According to
Hair et al. (2011) and Henseler et al. (2009), PLS is a regression-based approach that
works with small samples, handles both reflective and formative measures, can measure
non-normal data, and is less restrictive regarding data distribution. On the other hand,
CB-SEM requires a large sample, can only measure the reflective measures, and requires
fulfilling data normality (Hair et al., 2011).
PLS supports the prediction of structural models’ constructs. PLS-SEM is a good
approach to use when the object of the research is theory development and prediction
since PLS has a higher level of statistical power than CB-SEM. However, the CB-SEM
approach disregards the prediction objective. CB-SEM is a suitable approach when the
object of the research is confirmation and theory testing (Hair et al., 2011).
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Ethical Consideration
The review and approval of this study were received from the IRB of NSU (see
Appendix B). Thereafter, the participation letter, demographics questionnaire, and the
adapted instrument questionnaire were sent to the participants in the survey. Participation
letter was used to inform potential study participants about the purpose of this study, their
rights to privacy, and contact information.
Format for Presenting Results
In this chapter, validity and reliability of the adapted items were presented in
tables. According to the guidelines of NSU dissertation guide, IRB approval letters,
participation letter, and the survey instrument are presented in the appendices. In
addition, the findings of this study will be discussed in Chapter 4 along with screenshots
of data analysis processes and results.
Resource Requirements
Few required resources were needed to conduct this research, such as: (1) devices
with Internet access for the participants to participate, (2) a market research company to
recruit the participants, (3) an adapted questionnaire as an instrument to collect data, (4)
access to an expert panel to evaluate the survey instrument, (5) a pilot study to be
conducted with a pilot sample group by the researcher, and data were analyzed before
going on with the full study, (6) a secure laptop with sufficient computing resources to
handle the collected data, (7) access to an expert in statistical analysis, and (8) SmartPLS
and SPSS to analyze quantitative data.
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Summary
In this chapter, the research design, instrument development and validation,
sampling method, data analysis, presenting results formats, and resource requirements
were discussed. This study used a quantitative cross-sectional design to examine the
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. A proposed
sample was a convenience sample since it is conveniently accessible, inexpensive, and
quick (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). A survey questionnaire was developed by adapting
items from valid previous studies. Descriptive and inferential statistics were determined
to be used for data analysis. The results format of this study will be presented according
to the requirements of the NSU dissertation guide. In addition, all required resources to
conduct this study were determined and discussed.
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
A quantitative cross-sectional study was conducted using a survey strategy to
examine factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
Furthermore, this method was used to collect and analyze the numerical data. This study
involved the use of MTurk research company. MTurk was utilized to reach the
participants anonymously, and the survey was hosted by google forms. MTurk was
utilized to recruit participants because organizations are often unwilling to provide access
to their employees. Based on Kotulic and Clark (2004), organizations are unwilling to
allow outside researchers to access their employees, especially when the data is about
organizational information security. In this chapter, the Delphi study, custom
qualification technique, pilot study, and actual study were discussed along with their
results.
Phase One - Delphi Study
A Delphi study was conducted to ensure the content validity of the adapted
instrument. An expert panel consisting of those who are knowledgeable in the IS field
was invited by the researcher to conduct the Delphi study, and the instrument was revised
based on expert panel feedback. The expert panel was asked to evaluate the cognition,
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content, usability, and clarity of the instrument. Groves et al. (2011) stated that expert
panel’s reviews are based on content, usability, and cognition of the questionnaire. To
conduct a Delphi study, direct invitations were sent to 11experts by emails. Of the
11invited experts, only four experts accepted the invitation. According to Skulmoski et
al. (2007), the sample size for conducting a Delphi study varies from 4 to 171 experts.
The adapted survey instrument was sent to the expert panel for feedback. The
recommendations include minor changes for a few items to improve clarity, remove
items that are not related to the constructs, add more items for specific constructs, and
changing all self-efficacy items since some experts commented that the items are not
related to the self-efficacy construct. Therefore, based on the experts’ feedback, the
instrument was revised, and a consensus was reached among experts in the second round
(see Table 3). Based on Delbecq et al. (1975), mostly two to three Delphi rounds are
sufficient to reach consensus. After that, the researcher submitted an amendment to the
IRB and got approval for using the modified instrument (see Appendix C).
Table 3
Revised Adapted Survey Instrument
Perceived Vulnerability Threat
PV1

PV2
PV3
PV4

I know that my organizational password could be
vulnerable to security breaches if I don’t follow my
organization’s password policies.
I could fall victim to password attacks if I fail to comply
with my organizational password policies.
I believe that trying to protect my organizational password
will reduce illegal access to it.
My organizational password may be compromised if I
don’t pay adequate attention to password policies.

Ifinedo (2012)
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Table 3 (continued)
Revised Adapted Survey Instrument

PS1
PS2
PS3

PS4
PS5
PS6
PS7

SE1
SE2
SE3

SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7

RE1
RE2
RE3

RE4

Perceived Severity Threat
Threats on my organizational account would be a serious
problem.
Loss of data resulting from compromising my
organizational password would be a serious problem.
Having my organizational account accessed by someone
else without my permission or knowledge would be a
serious problem.
Having security breaches successfully attack my
organizational account would be very problematic.
I view password security attacks on my organizational
password as harmful.
I believe that threat to my organizational password is
severe.
I believe that threat to my organizational password is
significant.
Self-Efficacy
I feel comfortable following password policies to protect
my organizational password.
Following password policies is entirely under my control.
I have the necessary skills to implement the requirements
of password policies in order to protect my organizational
password.
I have the knowledge and resources to fulfill the
requirements of password policies.
Following password policies is easy.
I’m able to follow password policies by myself.
I can enable password policies on my organizational
password.
Response Efficacy
If I were to engage in efforts to protect my organizational
password, those efforts would be effective.
Password policies that protect organizational passwords are
effective.
Preventive password policies available to me are adequate
to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing my
organizational password.
Preventive password policies available to me are adequate
to prevent password security attacks from guessing my
organizational password.

McGill and
Thompson
(2018).

Witte (1996)

McGill and
Thompson
(2018)
Workman et al.
(2008)
McGill and
Thompson
(2018)

Posey et al.
(2015)
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Table 3 (continued)
Revised Adapted Survey Instrument

PCS1

Response Cost
Complying with password policies’ requirements is time
consuming for me.
Complying with password policies’ requirements is
burdensome for me.
Complying with password policies’ requirements is costly
for me.
Complying with the requirements of password policies is
inconvenience for me.
The cost of complying with the requirements of password
policies exceeds the benefits.
Perceived Severity Sanction
My organization punishes employees who break password
policies.
My organization terminates employees who violate
password policies repeatedly.
If I were caught violating my organization’s password
policies, I would be punished severely.
I would receive reprimand in oral if I were caught violating
my organization’s password policies.
I would receive reprimand in written report if I were caught
violating my organization’s password policies.
Perceived Certainty Sanction
If I don’t follow password policies, I will be punished.

PCS2

If I violate password policies, I would probably get caught.

RC1
RC2
RC3
RC4
RC5

PSS1
PSS2
PSS3
PSS4
PSS5

PPO1
PPO2
PPO3

IC1
IC2
IC3

Perceived Psychological Ownership
I feel like my work account is mine.
I feel a high degree of personal ownership of my
organizational account.
I sense that I own my work account.
Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation)
I intend to comply with the requirements of my
organization’s password policies.
I intend to protect my work account according to the
requirements of my organization’s password policies.
I intend to carry out my responsibility prescribed in my
organization’s password policies whenever possible.

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

McGill and
Thompson
(2018)

Herath and Rao
(2009)

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

Siponen et al.
(2010)
Peace et al.
(2003)
Yoo et al.
(2018)

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)
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Table 3 (continued)
Revised Adapted Survey Instrument
IC4

AC1
AC2
AC3

My intention is to continue complying with my
Ifinedo (2012)
organization’s password policies.
Actual Compliance with Password Policies
I adhere to the password policies that exist at my
organization.
To the best of my knowledge, I do not violate password Sommestad et
policies that exist at my organization.
al. (2015)
I currently work entirely in accordance with the password
policies that exist at my organization.

Phase Two - Custom Qualification Technique
To identify qualified participants for this study, it was important to prepare
targeted participants with specific criteria. Therefore, a few questions were published via
a human intelligence task (HIT) to assign the custom qualification (see Appendix D).
Each response included the worker ID of the participant, which was used to assign the
worker who meets the criteria to custom qualification. Only qualified participants were
invited later for the pilot study as well as the actual study. The qualified participant
should be an adult employee who works at an organization with password policies and
use a password to log in to his or her work account. Via HIT, the researcher requested
500 responses from employees at organizations in the United States to screen for
qualified participants. Among the 500 employees surveyed, 425 met the criteria, which is
almost 85% of the employees surveyed. Workers’ ID was very important, so the
researcher could identify (a) who was qualified to participate and (b) who participated in
the pilot study so they would not be invited to participate in the actual study.
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Phase Three - Pilot Study
After evaluating the instrument content and before conducting the actual study, a
pilot study was done for instrument reliability using a small group from the actual
sample. The survey was piloted with 39 employees from the qualified participants. The
participants were asked to complete the survey and offer suggestions to improve the
clarity of the instrument. Most of the participants had no comments regarding improving
the instruments, but two participants mentioned that password policies are enforced by
the system. In addition, 65% of the participants responded with “Strongly Agree” for the
actual compliance construct. Therefore, the researcher added a section about what is
considered a violation of password policies that cannot be enforced by the system, which
would affect their answers in the actual study. In addition, the researcher changed the
instrument scale from a 5-point scale to a 7- point scale to provide the participants with
more options to choose from.
Instrument Reliability
All the subscales were found reliable because Cronbach’s alpha values were
above 0.7. According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), Cronbach’s alpha should be at least
0.7 to ensure reliability. However, there may be redundancy in the items of the Intention
to Comply construct. Furthermore, for Threat Severity and Actual Compliance, the vast
majority of the responses were either “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” (See Table 4).
Notice that the Table 5 below shows what Cronbach’s alpha would be if a
question were deleted. Cronbach’s alpha remains at 0.98 regardless of which question is
deleted. Consequently, a slight change in wording is a better strategy for reducing
redundancy. Therefore, IC4 was reworded to avoid redundancy.

57
Table 4
Reliability of Scale Based on a Pilot Study

Scale

Cronbach’s
alpha
Mean

Intention to Comply
Threat Severity
Psychological
Ownership
Severity of Sanction
Actual Compliance
Response Efficacy
Certainty of Sanction
Threat Vulnerability
Response Cost
Self-Efficacy

Variance

.990
.952

4.494
4.403

.703
.531

.946
.940
.940
.932
.918
.912
.910
.895

3.880
3.082
4.564
4.000
3.397
4.436
2.144
4.289

1.150
1.392
.531
1.013
1.469
.692
1.591
.761

Note
likely redundancy IC2
68% Strongly Agree

63% Strongly Agree

Table 5
Cronbach’s Alpha if an Item is Deleted
Intention to Comply
with Password Policies
(Protection Motivation)
[IC1: I intend to
comply with the
requirements of my
organization’s
password policies.]
[IC2: I intend to protect
my work account
according to the
requirements of my
organization’s
password policies.]

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Corrected
Variance if
Item-Total
Item Deleted Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

13.49

6.414

.969

.988

13.51

6.046

.988

.983
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Table 5 (continued)
Cronbach’s Alpha if an Item is Deleted
Intention to Comply
with Password Policies
(Protection Motivation)
[IC3: I intend to carry
out my responsibility
prescribed in my
organization’s
password policies
whenever possible.]
[IC4: My intention is to
continue complying
with my organization's
password policies.]

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Corrected
Variance if
Item-Total
Item Deleted Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

13.46

6.097

.970

.987

13.46

6.097

.970

.987

Factor Analysis
Factor analysis groups together items that “vary together” by explaining the
variance in responses among participants in the sample. Changes were done and reflected
on the instrument based on the factor analysis results (see Appendix E). First, two items
were not grouped with any factor, indicating that these questions did not work and
needed to be removed: (a) Self-Efficacy [SE2: Following password policies is entirely
under my control.] and (b) Perceived Severity Threat [PS7: I believe that threat to my
organizational password is significant.]. Second, PSS1 item was removed from perceived
severity sanction construct since it is not related to the construct. For the last version of
the revised instrument (see Table 6 below).
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Table 6
Last Version of the Revised Instrument
Perceived Vulnerability Threat
PV1

PV2
PV3
PV4

PS1
PS2
PS3

PS4
PS5
PS6

SE1

SE2

SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6

RE1

I know that my organizational password could be
vulnerable to security breaches if I don’t follow my
organization’s password policies.
I could fall victim to password attacks if I fail to comply
with my organizational password policies.
I believe that trying to protect my organizational password
will reduce illegal access to it.
My organizational password may be compromised if I
don’t pay adequate attention to password policies.
Perceived Severity Threat
Threats on my organizational account would be a serious
problem.
Loss of data resulting from compromising my
organizational password would be a serious problem.
Having my organizational account accessed by someone
else without my permission or knowledge would be a
serious problem.
Having security breaches successfully attack my
organizational account would be very problematic.
I view password security attacks on my organizational
password as harmful.
I believe that threat to my organizational password is
severe.
Self-Efficacy
I feel comfortable following password policies to protect
my organizational password.
I have the necessary skills to implement the requirements
of password policies in order to protect my organizational
password.
I have the knowledge and resources to fulfill the
requirements of password policies.
Following password policies is easy.
I’m able to follow password policies by myself.
I can enable password policies on my organizational
password.
Response Efficacy
If I were to engage in efforts to protect my organizational
password, those efforts would be effective.

Ifinedo (2012).

McGill and
Thompson
(2018).

Witte (1996).

McGill and
Thompson
(2018).
Workman et al.
(2008).
McGill and
Thompson
(2018).

Posey et al.
(2015).

60
Table 6 (continued)
Last Version of the Revised Instrument
RE2

PCS1

Password policies that protect organizational passwords are
effective.
Preventive password policies available to me are adequate
to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing my
organizational password.
Preventive password policies available to me are adequate
to prevent password security attacks from guessing my
organizational password.
Response Cost
Complying with password policies’ requirements is time
consuming for me.
Complying with password policies’ requirements is
burdensome for me.
Complying with password policies’ requirements is costly
for me.
Complying with the requirements of password policies is
inconvenience for me.
The cost of complying with the requirements of password
policies exceeds the benefits.
Perceived Severity Sanction
My organization terminates employees who violate
password policies repeatedly.
If I were caught violating my organization’s password
policies, I would be punished severely.
I would receive reprimand in oral if I were caught violating
my organization’s password policies.
I would receive reprimand in written report if I were caught
violating my organization’s password policies.
Perceived Certainty Sanction
If I don’t follow password policies, I will be punished.

PCS2

If I violate password policies, I would probably get caught.

RE3

RE4

RC1
RC2
RC3
RC4
RC5

PSS1
PSS2
PSS3
PSS4

PPO1
PPO2
PPO3

Perceived Psychological Ownership
I feel like my work account is mine.
I feel a high degree of personal ownership of my
organizational account.
I sense that I own my work account.
Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation)

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010).

McGill and
Thompson
(2018).

Herath and Rao
(2009).

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010).

Siponen et al.
(2010).
Peace et al.
(2003).
Yoo et al.
(2018).
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Table 6 (continued)
Last Version of the Revised Instrument
IC1
IC2
IC3
IC4

AC1
AC2
AC3

I intend to comply with the requirements of my
organization’s password policies.
I intend to protect my work account according to the
requirements of my organization’s password policies.
I intend to carry out my responsibility prescribed in my
organization’s password policies whenever possible.
My intention is to continue complying with my
organization’s password policies in the future.
Actual Compliance with Password Policies
I adhere to the password policies that exist at my
organization.
To the best of my knowledge, I do not violate password
policies that exist at my organization.
I currently work entirely in accordance with the password
policies that exist at my organization.

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010).

Ifinedo (2012).

Sommestad et
al. (2015).

Phase Four - Actual Data Collection Technique
Data were collected by sending an anonymous survey. Based on the G* power,
100 participants are needed; therefore, the researcher collected 151 responses considering
the data cleaning. Fortunately, there were no missing data since each question was
marked as required.
Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Data screening involves examining the research data for missing data, outliers,
and normality assumption responses to determine the readiness of the data for further
statistical analysis (Sekaran & Bougie, 2012). To ensure that the data used was accurate
before the actual data analysis, a pre-data analysis screening was done. Responses
collected from the online survey were downloaded from google forms into Microsoft
Excel for the pre-data analysis screening. At the initial stage, the data were subjected to
visual inspection by the researcher to identify response-set biases. However, no
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substantial response-set biases were found. Subsequently, missing values were examined
using descriptive statistics, such as means, standard deviations, minimum as well as
maximum values. Missing data refers to an unanswered item on a survey instrument by a
respondent either intentionally or unintentionally (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014). Missing
values were not present as all the questions listed on the google forms were indicated as
required for respondents to select from a proposed option before they can move to the
next stage of the questionnaire. Frequencies of the descriptive statistics were valid for all
the responses. Also, there were no missing values as indicated by the descriptive
statistics. Therefore, prior to the analysis, the answers or responses gathered were
examined using SPSS for missing values, accuracy of data entry, and outliers.
Mahalanobis distance statistic was used to test the multivariate outliers in this study. To
sum up, there were no eliminated values, leaving 151 responses for data analysis.
Test of Assumptions
Various assumptions were tested to perform regression analyses. Assumptions
were examined with regards to linearity, independence of variables, multicollinearity,
homoscedasticity, outliers as well as normality distribution. The results are presented as
follows:
1. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2019), a histogram made up of regression
standardized residuals along with the normal probability plot that plots the observations
against the predicted cumulative probability values were used to determine the normality
of distribution. The results revealed that the data spread out normally in a bell-shaped
curve (Appendix F, Figure 5), while normal P-P plot residuals resemble a straight line
(Appendix F, Figure 6). Based on Mertler and Vanatta (2017), the assumption was met.
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2. Multicollinearity occurs when at least two independent variables are strongly related in
the regression model (Mertler & Vanatta, 2017). To assess the existence or absence of
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) values were examined. According to
Hair et al. (2011), VIF values should be less than 5 and tolerance values should be more
than 0.20. Otherwise, a collinearity problem can occur. The results indicate no
collinearity problem (Appendix F, Figure 7).
3. To determine linearity, a scatterplot of the standardized residuals against the expected
values is used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019). The residuals were distributed predictably
and related linearly along the regression line, satisfying the linearity combinations of
variables, according to the scatterplot (Appendix F, Figure 8).
4. Homoscedasticity is “the assumption that the variability in scores for one continuous
variable is roughly the same at all values of another continuous variable” (Mertler &
Vanatta, 2017, p. 35). Scatterplot was examined to also assess homoscedasticity
(Appendix F, Figure 8). According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the
homoscedasticity assumption is related to the normality assumption. If the multivariate
normality assumption is met, then the two variables must have a homoscedastic
relationship.
5. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics test was used to determine the case/error
independence. A Durbin-Watson value of 2 or closer to 2 means that the residuals or
errors are independent (Mertler & Vanatta, 2017). The D-W number was 1.956, revealing
that the assumption was met (Appendix F, Figure 9).
6. Cook’s distance statistics describes the findings that adversely affect the overall
regression model and revealed no major outliers or influential points (Tabachnick &
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Fidell, 2019). All Cook’s distance values were less than 0.358 (Appendix F, Figure 10).
A meaning greater than 1.0 should be taken seriously (Cook, 1977). Based on the results
of Mahalanobis distance outlier detection test, there was no need to delete any values.
This assumption was met.
Demographic Analysis
Five demographic indicators were collected, which are age, gender, computer
skill level, highest degree, and ethnicity. Among 151 participants, 78 (51.7%) were
females and 73 (48.3%) were males. Moreover, 7 (4.6%) were between 18–25 age group,
38 (25.2 %) were between 26–35 age group, 45 (29.8%) were between 36–45 age group,
37 (24.5 %) were between 46–55 age group, and 24 (15.9%) were between 56–65 age
group. A greater number of respondents fall between the 36–45 age groups. Also, more
than half of the respondents had a high level of computer skills. Among the responses, 81
(53.6%) reported having high computer skills and 70 (46.4%) reported having medium
computer skills. Furthermore, most of the participants (129, 85.4%) were white, while
Hispanic were four. Furthermore, the majority have undergraduate or graduate degrees at
66 (43.7%) and 40 (26.5%), respectively (see Table 7).
Table 7
Demographic Description
Characteristic
Age

Frequency Percentage
18-25 years
26-35 years
36-45 years
46-55 years
56-65 years

7
38
45
37
24

4.6
25.2
29.8
24.5
15.9

Women

78

51.7

Gender

65
Table 7 (continued)
Demographic Description
Characteristic

Frequency Percentage
Men
73
48.3

Computer Skill
High
Medium
Highest Degree
High school diploma
Associate degree
Undergraduate degree
Graduate degree
Ethnicity
African-American
Asian
Hispanic
White
Other

81
70

53.6
46.4

24
21
66
40

15.9
13.9
43.7
26.5

7
10
4
129
1

4.6
6.6
2.6
85.4
0.7

Reliability and Validity
Testing the reliability and validity of the instrument is important to ensure the
accuracy of the results. Straub (1989) defined reliability as “the stability of individual
measures across replications from the same source of information” (p. 160). To ensure
the reliability of the instrument, all items were adapted from previous reliable and valid
studies. Internal consistency of the adapted instrument was measured using Cronbach's
alpha. Cronbach’s alpha measures how closely items are related in the same group (Hair,
Hult, et al., 2014). The values of Cronbach’s alpha were measured twice after conducting
both pilot study and actual study.
Construct validity is assessed through convergent and discriminant validity
(Straub, 1989). Convergent validity is measured by the outer loadings technique or AVE
value (Hair, Sarstedt, et al., 2014). In this study, convergent validity was measured using
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AVE in SmartPLS 3.0. AVE examines how each construct explains its indicators’
variance (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014). Convergent validity is supported when the AVE value
is 0.50 or higher (Hair, Sarstedt, et al., 2014). In addition, discriminant validity can be
measured by cross loadings method (Henseler et al., 2009) as well as Fornell- Larcker
criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This study used Fornell-Larcker criterion to examine
discriminant validity. Discriminant validity is supported when the square root of every
construct’s AVE is higher than any other construct’s highest correlation (Fornell &
Larcker, 1981). Additionally, content validity was assessed by the expert panel review
through a Delphi study.
Cronbach’s alpha values along with composite reliability values were used to
examine the constructs’ reliability. The construct reliability was supposed to be
determined by these two criteria. Internal reliability was suggested by Cronbach’s alphas
and composite reliability values of 0.7 or greater. According to Fornell and Larcker
(1981), Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.7 and above are accepted. Both Cronbach’s alpha
and composite reliability values were above 0.7, as indicated in Table 8, which means
that the adapted instrument is reliable. As a result, all the latent variables have high levels
of internal consistency reliability. Moreover, AVE was used to investigate the construct's
convergent validity, and it was found that AVE values for all the latent variables (AC, IC,
PCS, PPO, PRC, PS, PSS, PV, PE, and SE) were equal or above the minimum accepted
value of 0.5. In addition, according to Hair and Sarstedt, et al. (2014), AVE values of at
least 0.5 represent acceptable validity
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Table 8
Construct Reliability and Convergent Validity
Constructs

Cronbach’s Rho A

Composite AVE

Alpha

Reliability

Perceived vulnerability threat (PV)

0.917

0.931

0.943

0.806

Perceived severity threat (PS)

0.923

0.931

0.940

0.724

Self-efficacy (SE)

0.850

0.906

0.888

0.615

Response efficacy (RE)

0.896

0.899

0.928

0.762

Response cost (RC)

0.941

0.951

0.962

0.894

Perceived severity sanction (PSS)

0.876

0.893

0.915

0.729

Perceived certainly sanction (PCS)

0.835

0.936

0.924

0.859

Perceived psychological ownership

0.970

1.297

0.978

0.936

0.953

0.954

0.966

0.878

0.950

0.953

0.968

0.909

(PPO)
Intention to comply with password
policies (protection motivation) (IC)
Actual compliance with password
policies (AC)

In this study, the discriminant validity of the constructs was examined using the
criterion proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981). SmartPLS 3.0 was used to calculate the
square root of the AVE values for all latent variables (see Table 9). According to Fornell
and Larcker, to demonstrate discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE value for
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each construct should be greater than any correlation values among all other latent
variables.
Table 9
Discriminant Validity
Square Root of AVE and the Correlation Values.
AC

IC

PCS

PPO

RC

PS

PSS

PV

RE

SE

AC

0.953

IC

0.810

0.937

PCS

0.384

0.370

0.927

PPO

0.050

0.102

0.052

0.968

RC

0.335

0.312

0.176

0.060

0.820

PS

0.533

0.508

0.283

0.063

0.145

0.851

PSS

0.292

0.265

0.862

0.090

0.144

0.281

0.854

PV

0.476

0.503

0.161

0.168

0.211

0.544

0.102

0.898

RE

0.421

0.598

0.253

0.134

0.253

0.464

0.229

0.478

0.873

SE

0.468

0.568

0.192

0.122

0.458

0.375

0.139

0.493

0.635 0.754

The square root of the AVE values reported for AC (0.953), IC (0.937), PCS
(0.927), PPO (0.968), RC (0.820), PS (0.851), PSS (0.851), PV (0.898), RE (0.873), and
SE (0.754) is shown in Table 9. It shows that the calculated square root of each AVE
value is greater than all other latent variables’ correlations. As a result, the criterion of the
discriminant validity was met.
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Research Hypotheses
The study examined factors that influence employees’ compliance with password
policies. Specifically, it examined the relationship between perceived vulnerability threat,
perceived severity threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived
severity sanction, perceived certainty sanction, perceived psychological ownership,
intention to comply with password policies, and the actual compliance with password
policies. The following hypotheses were tested:
H1a: Perceived vulnerability threat is positively related to employees’ intention to
comply with password policies.
H1b: Perceived severity threat is positively related to employees’ intention to comply
with password policies.
H1c: Response efficacy is positively related to employees’ intention to comply with
password policies.
H1d: Self-efficacy is positively related to employees’ intention to comply with password
policies.
H1e: Response cost is negatively related to employees’ intention to comply with
password policies.
H1f: Perceived severity sanction of noncompliance is positively related to employees’
intention to comply with password policies.
H1g: Perceived certainty sanction of noncompliance is positively related to employees’
intention to comply with password policies.
H1h: Perceived psychological ownership of the organizational account is positively
related to employees’ intention to comply with password policies.
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H2: Employees’ intention to comply with password policies is positively related to their
actual compliance with the password policies.
The study tested nine hypotheses by estimating path coefficients and using Smart
PLS 3.0 software. The relationship among the independent variables and the dependent
variables (hypotheses: H1a-H2) were tested and the results are presented in Figure 2 and
Figure 3. They depict the standardized path coefficients (β) as well as the R-square (R2)
values for the hypothesized model. Path coefficients represent “the hypothesized
relationships among the constructs” (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014, p. 171). Path coefficient
values range from -1 to +1. Path coefficient values that are close to +1 represent strong
positive relationships, and path coefficient values that are close to -1 represent strong
negative relationships. On the other hand, path coefficient values that are close to 0
represent weak and nonsignificant relationships (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014).
In Figure 2, it can be deduced from path coefficients values that IC (β=0.810) has
the strongest influence on AC. PCS (β= 0.361) has the strongest influence on IC,
followed by RE (β = 0.265), PSS (β = -0.211), SE (β = 0.195), PS (β = 0.192), and PV (β
= 0.124).
Figure 2
Path Coefficients
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Coefficient of determination (R2 value) was used to evaluate the structural model
and is defined as “a measure of the model’s predictive accuracy and is calculated as the
squared correlation between a specific endogenous construct’s actual and predicted
values” (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014, p. 174). R2 explains the combined variance of the
independent latent variables on the dependent latent variable (Hair, Hult, et al., 2014).
Chin (1998) stated that R2 value of 0.19 is considered weak, R2 value of 0.33 is
considered moderate, and R2 value of 0.67 is considered significant. Figure 3 shows the
coefficient of the determination for latent variables, R2 for IC is 0.528 and R2 for AC is
0.656. Thus, factors such as PV, PS, RE, SE, PRC, PSS, PCS and PPO predict about
52.8% of the variance in IC, whereas IC explains 65.6% of the variance in AC. The R2
values are shown inside the circle or inside the construct (IC and AC).
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Figure 3
PLS Analysis Results for R2 values to explain the variance of independent variables on the dependent variable.
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The bootstrapping technique was used to examine the significance of the
structural model. Since the sample is small, the researcher preferred using the
bootstrapping technique rather than the traditional method for better inferences about the
population. According to Hair, Hult, et al. (2014), using 5000 subsamples, which are
drawn with replacement from the original sample, is recommended to avoid bias.
Figure 4 and Table 10 illustrate the results of the bootstrapping analysis with 5000
bootstrap samples along with the path coefficients to assess the significance of the
hypotheses using Smart PLS 3.0. The results show that RE (β = 0.265, t = 2.371, p
<0.05), SE (β = 0.195, t = 2.056, p <0.05) and PCS (β = 0.361, t = 2.562, p <0.05) have a
significant positive effect on intention to comply with password policies (protection
motivation) (IC). This means that hypotheses H1c, H1d and H1g were fully supported.
On the other hand, PSS (β = -0.211, t =1.627, p >0.05) has a negative insignificant effect
on IC. However, this hypothesis (H1f) was not supported. Moreover, PV (β = 0.124, t =
0.937, p >0.05), PS (β = 0.192, t = 1.693, p >0.05), PRC (β = 0.068, t = 1.056, p >0.05),
and PPO (β = 0.006, t = 0.102, p >0.05) have no significant positive effect on IC. Thus,
hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1e, H1f and H1h were not supported.
Regarding the influence of IC on AC, it was found that there was a strong positive
influence of IC (β = 0.810, t = 20.712, p <0.05) on AC. Therefore, this hypothesis (H2)
was supported. This means that intention to comply (IC) with password policy is
positively related to the actual compliance with the password policies (AC). For the
summary of the results (see Table 10).
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Figure 4
Bootstrapping Analysis Results for Factors That Influence Employees’ Compliance with Password Policies
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Table 10
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for H1a-H2
H

Path

p-value

Remarks

PV → IC

Path
t-value
Coefficients
0.124
0.937

H1a

0.371

H1b

PS → IC

0.192

1.693

0.078

H1c
H1d
H1e

RE → IC
SE → IC
PRC → IC

0.265
0.195
0.068

2.371
2.056
1.056

0.020
0.040
0.303

H1f

PSS → IC

-0.211

1.627

0.123

H1g
H1h

PCS → IC
PPO → IC

0.361
0.006

2.562
0.102

0.015
0.922

H2

IC → AC

0.810

20.712

0.000

Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported

Summary
This chapter revealed the study findings. First, the expert panel’s review results
were outlined, and slight changes were made to the instrument based on the expert panel’s
feedback. Second, the custom qualification technique was described along with its results
and ended with 425 qualified employees. Third, the pilot study was conducted with 39
participants. Based on the results, a few adjustments to the instrument were made. Finally,
the actual study was conducted to examine the proposed hypotheses along with pre-analysis
data screening, the reliability and the validity of the instrument, and descriptive and
inferential statistics using SPSS and SmartPLS 3.0. Among the nine proposed hypotheses,
the results revealed that H1c, H1d, and H1g had a major effect on the intention to comply
(IC) with passwords and were thus fully supported. In addition, H2 had a significant effect
on the actual compliance with the password policies and were therefore fully supported.
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Nevertheless, the rest of the hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1e, H1f, and H1h) were not
supported. These results are explained further in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
Employees’ low motivation to comply with password policies increases passwords
susceptibility (Choong et al., 2014; Habib et al., 2018; Inglesant & Sassa, 2010; Shay et al.,
2010), and consequently leads to financial damages to organizations (Wakefield, 2004). A
few studies have examined the influence of employees’ intention to comply with password
policies (Anye, 2019; Choong & Theofanos, 2015). Mwagwabi (2015) as well as
Mwagwabi et al. (2018) also asserted that there is a lack of password research that links the
intention to comply with the actual compliance behaviors.
This study aimed to address the scarcity of research by examining what factors
influence employees’ compliance with password policies. The research goal was achieved
by applying the theoretical model to assess the relationship between employees’ perceptions
of threat vulnerability, threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost,
severity of sanction, certainty of sanction, psychological ownership, and their intention to
comply with password policies, as well as the relationship between the intentions to comply
with the actual password policies compliance.
The hypotheses (H1a-H1e) integrated PMT constructs of perceived vulnerability
threat, perceived severity threat, response cost, response efficacy, and self-efficacy, and
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how they predict employees’ intention to comply with password policies. As shown in the
results, this study found that response efficacy influenced employees’ intention to comply
with password policies, which is supported by previous studies. For example, Johnston and
Warkentin (2010) noticed that response efficacy positively influenced users’ intention to
fulfill the suggested security measures. Posey et al. (2015) revealed that response efficacy
had the most significant effect on employees’ protection motivation behaviors among other
constructs. Ifinedo (2012) showed that response efficacy positively influenced intention to
comply with IS policies in an organizational setting. Moreover, Mwagwabi (2015) as well
as Mwagwabi et al. (2014) found that perceived password response efficacy influences
user’s intention to comply with password guidelines. Similarly, Kusyanti and Sari (2017)
contended that response efficacy influences the intention to change passwords among
university students.
This study also found that self- efficacy positively influences employee’s intention
to comply with password policies, which is supported by previous studies. For example,
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) found that self-efficacy has a positive impact on users’
intention to comply with security measures. Anye (2019) revealed that self-efficacy is
positively related to employees’ intentions to comply with password policies. Mwagwabi
(2015) as well as Mwagwabi et al. (2014) contended that self-efficacy significantly
influences Internet users’ intention to comply with password guidelines. Additionally,
Ifinedo (2012) uncovered that self-efficacy significantly influences employees’ intention to
comply with IS policies.
Perceived severity threat, on the other hand, has no influence on employees’
intention to comply with password policies as hypothesized, which is supported by Ifinedo
(2012) and Posey et al. (2015). Ifinedo (2012) as well as Posey et al. (2015) found that
perceived severity was insignificantly related to intention to comply with IS policies and
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protection motivation of insiders’ security behaviors, respectively. However, Siponen et al.
(2014) as well as Mwagwabi et al. (2014) found that perceived severity positively
associated with employees’ intention to comply with IS policy and Internet users’ intention
to comply with password guidelines, respectively. Giwah (2019) inferred that response
efficacy and self-efficacy dismiss the effect of perceived severity threat. In this study, both
response efficacy and self-efficacy have significant influences on intention to comply with
password policies, which would dismiss the effect of perceived severity threat on the
intention to comply with password policies.
Perceived vulnerability threat, another threat appraisal, has no influence on
employees’ intention to comply with password policies, which is contradicted by previous
literature findings. For example, Zhang and McDowell (2009) asserted that perceiving a
high degree of password vulnerability threat motivates individuals to behave securely to
protect password from being compromised. Similarly, previous studies have found that
perceived vulnerability threat positively predicts employees’ intention to comply with IS
policies (Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen et al., 2014). Posey et al. (2015) also considered perceived
vulnerability threat as a major component in forming protection motivation behaviors. In
contrast, Kusyanti and Sari (2017) found that perceived vulnerability threat has no influence
on students’ intention to reset passwords. Additionally, Mwagwabi et al. (2014), Mwagwabi
(2015), as well as Mwagwabi et al. (2018) found that perceived vulnerability has no effect
on Internet users’ intention to comply with password guidelines. Mwagwabi et al. (2014)
suggested comparing the intention to comply between users who have been impacted by
hacking and who have not in order to understand why perceived vulnerability did not
influence Internet users’ intention to comply with password guidelines. Consequently, in
2015, Mwagwabi found that there is a relationship between exposure to hacking and
perceived vulnerability, but still there is no relationship between perceived vulnerability
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and users’ intention to comply with password guidelines. Mwagwabi (2015) suggested that
users behave differently when safeguarding personal accounts versus organizational
accounts. Ifinedo (2012) as well as Siponen et al. (2014) showed that there is an association
between perceived vulnerability and the intention to comply with IS policies in
organizational settings, while Mwagwabi (2015) showed that there is no association
between perceived vulnerability and intention to comply with password guidelines in
personal settings, which differs from this study setting. Therefore, the reason why perceived
vulnerability had no influence on employees’ intention to comply with password policies is
still unknown, which is recommended to be investigated in future research.
This study also revealed that response cost has no influence on employees’ intention
to comply with password policies, which is contrary to previous studies’ findings.
According to Kusyanti and Sari (2017), response cost had a negative influence on students’
intention to reset passwords. Additionally, Posey et al. (2015) found that response cost is
negatively associated with employees’ protection motivation toward information assets.
According to Herath and Rao (2009), response cost did not have a significant influence on
compliance intentions, while response efficacy and self-efficacy had significant influences
on compliance intentions. Posey et al. (2015) as well as Boss et al. (2015) also asserted that
among coping appraisal constructs, self-efficacy and response efficacy have more effects
than response cost on individual’s protection motivation. Boss et al. explained that response
efficacy and self-efficacy outweigh the effect of response cost on individual’s protection
motivation.
The hypotheses (H1f & H1g) integrated GDT constructs of perceived severity
sanction and perceived certainty sanction, and how they predict employees’ intention to
comply with password policies. This study revealed that only perceived certainty sanction
influences employees’ intention to comply with password policies but not perceived
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severity sanction. Herath and Rao (2009) also found that perceived certainty sanction has a
positive effect on intention to comply with IS policies but not perceived severity sanction.
Chen et al. (2012) showed that certainty of control and severity of sanction are significant
in coercing complying with security policies. In addition, D’Arcy et al. (2009) implied that
perceived severity of formal sanction has more influence than perceived certainty sanction;
however, perceived certainty sanction has more influence than perceived severity sanction
in deterring IS misuse only when the level of morality is high. D’Arcy et al. explained that
people with high morality are more sensitive to certainty of sanction more than the severity
of sanction because it is unpleasant to them to be accused of an undesirable act. Conversely,
people with low morality are more concerned about penalties rather than being accused of
an undesirable act. Therefore, the explanation of this study’s findings that only perceived
certainty sanction affects the intention to comply with password policies, but not perceived
severity sanction would refer to participants’ high morality.
Hypothesis (H1h) examined perceived psychological ownership as a predictor of
employees’ intention to comply with password policies. The results revealed that perceived
psychological ownership has no influence on employees’ intention to comply with
password policies, which contradicts previous studies’ findings. According to Menard et al.
(2018), psychological ownership negatively influenced intention not to protect information.
Kim and Beehr (2017) also found that psychological ownership is negatively associated
with work deviant behaviors. Additionally, Yoo et al. (2018) showed that psychological
ownership significantly impacts the intention toward security compliance. Moreover, Van
Dyne and Pierce (2004) found a positive relationship between psychological ownership and
organizational behaviors. Therefore, the reason for the discrepancy in this study’s findings
and previous studies’ findings is unknown. This can be explained by uncovering the
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possible moderators’ effects or other organizational constructs that might offset the
influence of psychological ownership.
The second hypothesis (H2) examined intention to comply with password policies
as a predictor of the actual compliance with password policies. The results revealed that
actual compliance with password policies is significantly influenced by the intention to
comply with password policies. This finding is supported by the existing literature. Lau
(2020) found that intention has a substantial influence on actual mobile device usage.
Additionally, Siponen et al. (2014) implied that the intention to comply is positively related
to the actual compliance with IS policies. Moreover, Boss et al. (2015) indicated that
intention is related to the actual secure behaviors. However, Mwagwabi (2015) found no
strong association between intention to comply and actual password compliance.
Mwagwabi explained that the passwords created were only for the survey and do not reflect
the actual behaviors.
Limitations
A few limitations were found in this study. The sample size and technique affected
the accuracy as well as the generalizability of the results, respectively. The sample size was
limited to the participants who are members of the MTurk pool. This study was based on
self-reported data. In addition, this study was conducted with employees in general in the
U.S. without specifying sectors, such as education and commerce. Moreover, this study
collected information about employees’ security behaviors, which could depend on
participants’ honesty in answering questions. Based on research by Knapp and Kirk (2003),
study participants may be concerned about confidentiality when they disclose personal
security behaviors. Therefore, participants may not be truthful in their responses when
completing surveys related to password policies due to personal confidentiality concerns.
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Implications
This study has practical and theoretical contributions in IS literature by investigating
factors that may influence employees’ compliance with password policies. This study
helped to bridge the existing gap by developing a theoretical model based on four
behavioral theories: PMT, GDT, TRA, and psychological ownership theory. The theoretical
model proposed in this study may be explored and expanded upon in future research studies
to examine other security-related behaviors in various disciplines.
By determining the factors that influence employees’ password policy compliance,
organizations will better understand their employees’ behaviors toward complying with
password policies. Organizations can inspire employees’ password policies compliance by
focusing on the most impactful predictors. Moreover, organizations can tailor training and
education, and password policies designers can design new policies, while considering
these factors to promote and motivate compliance with password policies among employees
to prohibit financial losses.
The findings of this research study revealed several practical contributions to
organizations. For instance, self-efficacy and response efficacy are predictors of intention to
comply with password policies and consequently to the actual password policies’
compliance. Organizations should promote their employees’ beliefs and confidence
regarding their ability to protect organizational passwords from being compromised by
following policies, which consequently prevents information disclosure as well as financial
losses. Herath and Rao (2009) asserted that individuals who have confidence and belief in
their ability to undertake the activity will be more motivated to perform the action.
Therefore, training and educating employees on new skills, that make it easy for them to
follow the policies, are practical strategies. For example, organizations can train the
employee on how to create strong and memorable passwords at the same time. In addition,
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organizations need to inspire awareness among employees toward the password policies’
effectiveness in protecting organizational passwords. According to Zhang and McDowell
(2009), individuals who believe that protection behaviors, such as creating a strong
password and changing an old password, are effective in preventing threats will be more
motivated to perform protection behaviors.
Organizations should also increase the certainty of sanction of noncompliance with
password policies to deter employees from violating password policies. Organizations
should monitor policies violation to confirm the certainty of being caught and consequently
the certainty of being punished. According to Herath and Rao (2009), employees who are
aware of being monitored and perceive a high chance of being detected are more likely to
comply with policies.
Recommendations
This study recommends future studies continue examining other factors that may
influence employees’ compliance with password policies. For example, this study suggests
adding other PMT constructs to the model, such as maladaptive rewards (extrinsic and
intrinsic), to examine their influences on employees’ intention to comply with password
policies. Additionally, utilizing other behavioral theories is highly recommended to
examine other factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies.
Moreover, cultural differences may be added to the proposed model as moderator variables
to examine their impact on other constructs. Dinev et al. (2009) recommended examining
how cultural factors not only affect the behavioral intention but also the actual behaviors.
Based on Hofstede (1983), the terminology of national cultures consists of four dimensions:
(a) Individualism vs. Collectivism, (b) Masculinity vs. Femininity, (c) Large or Small
Power Distance, and (d) Strong or Weak Uncertainty Avoidance. In 2012, Hovav and
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D’Arcy found differences in cultures affect the impact of perceived severity and certainty
sanctions on security countermeasure.
This study examined employees’ compliance with password policies in general.
Therefore, the researcher suggests examining specific compliance behaviors, such as
sharing passwords, writing passwords down, and creating weak passwords. Blythe et al.
(2015) recommended reducing compliance to single security behavior to better understand
what influence specific security behavior. Additionally, since this study was limited to
MTurk employees, future research may be conducted to recruit a more diverse sample
population to ensure the generalizability of results. Moreover, a quasi-experimental
research design is recommended to compare trained or educated employees with those who
are not.
Using the proposed model is highly recommended to examine other security
behaviors. The researcher also recommended enhancing the instrument which could be
applied in different IS contexts. This study could also be repeated in different sectors, such
as education, commerce, and financial services. Abbott et al. (2018) stated that complying
with a password policy among users in different organizations, such as banks, medical
portals, and email providers, might differ.
Summary
This study addressed employees’ lack of compliance with password policies, which
leads to security issues (Choong et al., 2014; Habib et al., 2018; Inglesant & Sassa, 2010;
Shay et al., 2010). Several studies have examined employees’ behaviors in IS field (Blythe
et al., 2015; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Posey et al., 2015;
Sommestad et al., 2015). However, few studies were conducted specifically to understand
employees’ password policies compliance (Anye, 2019; Choong & Theofanos, 2015).
Additionally, there is a lack of research that associates the intention to comply with the
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actual compliance (Mwagwabi, 2015; Mwagwabi et al., 2018). The main goal of this study
was to examine factors that influence employees’ compliance with password policies. This
study determined what influences employees’ compliance with password policies by
examining the relationship between (perceived vulnerability threat, perceived severity
threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response cost, perceived severity sanction, perceived
certainty sanction, & perceived psychological ownership) and intention to comply with
password policies, as well as the relationship between the intention to comply with
password policies and the actual compliance with password policies.
The main research questions were:
RQ1: What is the relationship between (a) perceived vulnerability threat, (b)
perceived severity threat, (c) response efficacy, (d) self-efficacy, (e) response cost, (f)
perceived severity sanction of noncompliance, (g) perceived certainty sanction of
noncompliance, (h) perceived psychological ownership to the organizational account, and
employee’s intention to comply with password policies?
RQ2: What is the relationship between employees’ intention to comply with
password policies and their actual compliance with password policies?
To answer these research questions, a quantitative cross-sectional study was
conducted utilizing an adapted survey instrument that employed four behavioral theories. A
non-probability convenience sample was utilized. The study was conducted in a noncontrived setting and without interference to examine what factors influence employees’
compliance with password policies. The adapted survey was reviewed by the expert panel
using the Delphi technique and slight changes were made based on expert panel feedback.
A custom qualification technique was used resulting in 425 qualified employees. A
qualified participant is an adult employee who uses a password to log in to the
organizational account and works at organizations in U. S. that have password policies to
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comply with. Then, a pilot study was done with 39 participants out of the pool of 425
qualified participants. Afterwards, adjustments were made based on the pilot study results.
The researcher invited all the 425 qualified participants to participate in the pilot study. The
pilot study sample consisted of participants who were motivated to participate and
completed the survey.
Finally, the actual study employed 151 participants. Pre-analysis data screening, and
descriptive and inferential statistics were conducted using SPSS. In addition, SmartPLS 3.0
was used to examine instrument validity and the proposed hypotheses. The results revealed
that (H1c, H1d, & H1g) have significant effects on intention to comply with password
policies. To specify, self-efficacy, response efficacy, and perceived certainty sanction had
significant influences on intention to comply with password policies. Additionally,
intention to comply had a significant influence on employee actual compliance with
password policies, which supports H2. On the other hand, (H1a, H1b, H1e, H1f, & H1h)
had no significant effects on intention to comply with password policies. To specify,
perceived vulnerability threat, perceived severity threat, perceived severity sanction,
psychological ownership, and response cost had insignificant influences on employee’s
intention to comply with password policies.
The limitations of this research study included factors, such as sample size and
sample technique. The sample size was small, which affects the accuracy of the results, and
the sample technique was convenient, which is not generalizable. Additionally, this study
collected information about employees’ security behaviors and was based on self-reported
data, which would affect participants’ truth on answering the survey questions and
consequently the accuracy of the study results.
The findings of this study provided valuable insight into factors that may influence
employee compliance with password policies by developing a theoretical model based on
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four behavioral theories: PMT, GDT, TRA, and psychological ownership theory.
Determining the factors that influence employees’ password policy compliance may help
organizations better understand their employees’ behaviors. Consequently, organizations
can motivate employees’ password policies compliance by tailoring initiatives such as
training, education, and password policies design, while considering the impactful factors.
This study recommended opportunities for future research to examine other security
behaviors in different disciplines, while applying the developed theoretical model. Utilizing
other behavioral theories is also highly recommended to examine other factors that would
influence employees’ compliance with password policies. Future research is also needed on
security behaviors to explore additional PMT constructs that may enhance the proposed
model in this study, such as extrinsic and intrinsic maladaptive rewards. Moreover, national
cultural dimensions could be added to the model for further investigation. Another
recommendation is to recruit a large and diverse sample using experimental research design
to ensure the generalizability of results.
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire
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Survey Questionnaire
General Information

Age:
〇 18-25 years
〇 26-35 years
〇 36-45 years
〇 46-55 years
〇 56-65 years
〇 Older than 65

Gender:
〇 Male
〇 Female

Computer Skills:
〇 Low
〇 Medium
〇 High

Highest level of education completed:
〇 Less than a high school diploma
〇 High school diploma
〇 Associate degree
〇 Undergraduate degree
〇 Graduate degree

Ethnicity:
〇 African-American
〇 American Indian or Alaska Native
〇 Asian
〇 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
〇 White
〇 Hispanic
〇 Other

When you provide responses to the following survey items, please
keep in mind password policies can be violated by writing password
down, sharing password with anyone, creating same password for
different accounts, creating password that has a proper name or
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dictionary word, reusing old password, resetting password that is
related to the previous one, etc.
Feel Confident to Answer
Your responses are anonymous, and your personal identifiable
information will not be collected.
Please indicate your perception level with the following statements.
Perceived Vulnerability Threat *
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

PS1: Threats on my organizational
account would be a serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS2: Loss of data resulting from
compromising my organizational
password would be a serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS3: Having my organizational account
accessed by someone else without my
permission or knowledge would be a
serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS4: Having security breaches
successfully attack my organizational
account would be very problematic.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS5: I view password security attacks on
my organizational password as harmful.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS6: I believe that threat to my
organizational password is severe.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS1: Threats on my organizational
account would be a serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS2: Loss of data resulting from
compromising my organizational
password would be a serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS3: Having my organizational account
accessed by someone else without my
permission or knowledge would be a
serious problem.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PV1: I know that my organizational
password could be vulnerable to security
breaches if I don't follow my organization's
password policies.
PV2: I could fall victim to password attacks
if I fail to comply with my organizational
password policies.
PV3: I believe that trying to protect my
organizational password will reduce illegal
access to it.
PV4: My organizational password may be
compromised if I don't pay adequate
attention to password policies.

Perceived Severity Threat *
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PS4: Having security breaches
successfully attack my organizational
account would be very problematic.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS5: I view password security attacks on
my organizational password as harmful.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PS6: I believe that threat to my
organizational password is severe.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

SE1: I feel comfortable following
password policies to protect my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE2: I have the necessary skills to
implement the requirements of password
policies in order to protect my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE3: I have the knowledge and resources
to fulfill the requirements of password
policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE4: Following password policies is easy.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE5: I'm able to follow password policies
by myself.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE6: I can enable password policies on
my organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE1: I feel comfortable following
password policies to protect my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE2: I have the necessary skills to
implement the requirements of password
policies in order to protect my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE3: I have the knowledge and resources
to fulfill the requirements of password
policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE4: Following password policies is easy.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE5: I'm able to follow password policies
by myself.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

SE6: I can enable password policies on
my organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

RE1: If I were to engage in efforts to
protect my organizational password,
those efforts would be effective.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE2: Password policies that protect
organizational passwords are effective.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE3: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent
unauthorized persons from accessing my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE4: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent
password security attacks from guessing
my organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Self-Efficacy *

Response Efficacy *
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RE1: If I were to engage in efforts to
protect my organizational password,
those efforts would be effective.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE2: Password policies that protect
organizational passwords are effective.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE3: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent
unauthorized persons from accessing my
organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RE4: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent
password security attacks from guessing
my organizational password.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

RC1: Complying with password policies'
requirements is time consuming for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RC2: Complying with password policies'
requirements is burdensome for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RC3: Complying with password policies'
requirements is costly for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RC1: Complying with password policies'
requirements is time consuming for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RC2: Complying with password policies'
requirements is burdensome for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

RC3: Complying with password policies'
requirements is costly for me.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Response Cost *

RC4: Complying with the requirements of
password policies is inconvenience for
me.
RC5: The cost of complying with the
requirements of password policies
exceeds the benefits.

RC4: Complying with the requirements of
password policies is inconvenience for
me.
RC5: The cost of complying with the
requirements of password policies
exceeds the benefits.

Perceived Severity Sanction *

PSS1: My organization terminates
employees who violate password policies
repeatedly.
PSS2: If I were caught violating my
organization's password policies, I would
be punished severely.
PSS3: I would receive reprimand in oral if
I were caught violating my organization's
password policies.
PSS4: I would receive reprimand in
written report if I were caught violating my
organization's password policies.
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PSS1: My organization terminates
employees who violate password policies
repeatedly.
PSS2: If I were caught violating my
organization's password policies, I would
be punished severely.
PSS3: I would receive reprimand in oral if
I were caught violating my organization's
password policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

PCS1: If I don't follow password policies, I
will be punished.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PCS2: If I violate password policies, I
would probably get caught.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PCS1: If I don't follow password policies, I
will be punished.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PCS2: If I violate password policies, I
would probably get caught.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

PPO1: I feel like my work account is mine.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PPO2: I feel a high degree of personal
ownership of my work account.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PPO3: I sense that I own my work
account.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PPO1: I feel like my work account is mine.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PPO2: I feel a high degree of personal
ownership of my work account.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PPO3: I sense that I own my work
account.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

PSS4: I would receive reprimand in
written report if I were caught violating my
organization's password policies.

Perceived Certainty Sanction *

Perceived Psychological Ownership *

Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection Motivation) *
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

IC1: I intend to comply with the
requirements of my organization’s
password policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

IC2: I intend to protect my work account
according to the requirements of my
organization’s password policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

IC3: I intend to carry out my responsibility
prescribed in my organization’s password
policies whenever possible.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇
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IC4: My intention is to continue complying
with my organization's password policies
in the future.
IC1: I intend to comply with the
requirements of my organization’s
password policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

IC2: I intend to protect my work account
according to the requirements of my
organization’s password policies.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

IC3: I intend to carry out my responsibility
prescribed in my organization’s password
policies whenever possible.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

IC4: My intention is to continue complying
with my organization's password policies
in the future.

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Somewh
at agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

〇

Actual Compliance with Password
Policies *

AC1: I adhere to the password policies
that exist at my organization.
AC2: To the best of my knowledge, I do
not violate password policies that exist at
my organization.
AC3: I currently work entirely in
accordance with the password policies
that exist at my organization.
AC1: I adhere to the password policies
that exist at my organization.
AC2: To the best of my knowledge, I do
not violate password policies that exist at
my organization.
AC3: I currently work entirely in
accordance with the password policies
that exist at my organization.
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Appendix B: IRB Exempt Initial Approval Memo
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Appendix C: IRB Amendment Approval Memo

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM
To:

Enas Albataineh
College of Engineering and Computing

From:

Office of the Institutional Review Board

Date:

January 21, 2021

Subject:

IRB Exempt Amendment Approval Memo

TITLE:

Improving Employees' Compliance with Password Policies– NSU IRB Protocol
Number 2020-623

Dear Principal Investigator,

Your submission has been reviewed and Exempted by your IRB College Representative or their
Alternate on December 4, 2020. You may proceed with your study.

Please Note: Exempt studies do not require approval stamped documents. If your study site
requires stamped copies of consent forms, recruiting materials, etc., contact the IRB Office.

Level of Review: Exempt

Type of Approval: Amendment
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Exempt Review Category: Exempt 2: Interviews, surveys, focus groups, observations of public
behavior, and other similar methodologies

Post-Approval Monitoring: The IRB Office conducts post-approval review and monitoring of all
studies involving human participants under the purview of the NSU IRB. The Post-Approval Monitor
may randomly select any active study for a Not-for-Cause Evaluation.

Annual Status of Research Update: You are required to notify the IRB Office annually if your
research study is still ongoing via the Exempt Research Status Update xForm.

Final Report: You are required to notify the IRB Office within 30 days of the conclusion of the
research that the study has ended using the Exempt Research Status Update xForm.

The following modifications were approved:
• Addition of/change to study population
• Addition of/change to survey(s), questionnaire(s), or other research instruments

Translated Documents: No
Please retain this document in your IRB correspondence file.

CC:

Ling Wang, Ph.D.

Ling Wang, Ph.D.
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Appendix D: Custom Qualification Questions
1. Are you 18 years old or above?
•

Yes

•

No

2. Do you work at an organization that has password policies for the employees to obey?
•

Yes

•

No

3. Do you use password to log in to your organizational account?
•

Yes

•

No
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Appendix E: Pilot Study’s Factor Analysis
Factor
1
.224

2
.331

3
.089

4
.272

5
.788

6
.250

Perceived Vulnerability Threat [PV2: I could fall victim to
password attacks if I fail to comply with my organizational
password policies.]

.093

.173

.270

.285

.719

.031

Perceived Vulnerability Threat [PV1: I know that my
organizational password could be vulnerable to security
breaches if I don't follow my organization's password
policies. ]

.399

.233

.171

.134

.714

.138

Perceived Vulnerability Threat [PV3: I believe that trying to
protect my organizational password will reduce illegal access
to it.]

.315

.346

.152

.139

.594

.260

Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation) [IC2: I intend to protect my work account
according to the requirements of my organization’s password
policies.]

.944

.159

.153

-.052

.038

.188

Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation) [IC1: I intend to comply with the requirements of
my organization’s password policies.]

.935

.125

.179

-.058

.005

.191

Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation) [IC4: My intention is to continue complying with
my organization's password policies. ]

.905

.121

.157

-.024

.051

.211

Intention to Comply with Password Policies (Protection
Motivation) [IC3: I intend to carry out my responsibility
prescribed in my organization’s password policies whenever
possible.]

.904

.186

.168

.017

.071

.213

Perceived Severity Threat [PS5: I view password security
attacks on my organizational password as harmful.]
Perceived Severity Threat [PS1: Threats on my
organizational account would be a serious problem.]
Perceived Severity Threat [PS6: I believe that threat to my
organizational password is severe.]
Perceived Severity Threat [PS3: Having my organizational
account accessed by someone else without my permission
or knowledge would be a serious problem. ]

.823

.204

.143

.108

.353

.057

.738

.184

.135

.375

.302

.069

.631

.078

.277

.287

.350

-.089

.629

.164

.250

.435

.327

-.160

Perceived Severity Threat [PS4: Having security breaches
successfully attack my organizational account would be very
problematic.]

.604

.104

.226

.352

.439

-.294

Perceived Severity Threat [PS2: Loss of data resulting from
compromising my organizational password would be a
serious problem.]

.560

.123

.281

.584

.272

-.134

Perceived Psychological Ownership [PPO3: I sense that I
own my work account.]
Perceived Psychological Ownership [PPO2: I feel a high
degree of personal ownership of my work account.]

.026

.150

.155

.883

.100

.201

.144

.112

.135

.854

.175

.021

Perceived Vulnerability Threat [PV4: My organizational
password may be compromised if I don't pay adequate
attention to password policies. ]
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Appendix E: Pilot Study’s Factor Analysis (continued)
Perceived Psychological Ownership [PPO1: I feel like my
work account is mine.]
Self-Efficacy [SE4: I have the knowledge and resources to
fulfill the requirements of password policies.]
Self-Efficacy [SE3: I have the necessary skills to implement
the requirements of password policies in order to protect my
organizational password.]

.007

.178

.106

.761

.369

.307

.052

.876

-.140

.052

.110

.173

.076

.867

-.172

-.050

.145

.115

Response Efficacy [RE3: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent unauthorized
persons from accessing my organizational password.]

.052

.860

-.041

.240

.193

.037

Response Efficacy [RE4: Preventive password policies
available to me are adequate to prevent password security
attacks from guessing my organizational password.]

.088

.850

-.071

.152

.215

-.049

Self-Efficacy [SE6: I'm able to follow password policies by
myself.]
Response Efficacy [RE2: Password policies that protect
organizational passwords are effective.]
Response Efficacy [RE1: If I were to engage in efforts to
protect my organizational password, those efforts would be
effective.]

.097

.820

-.180

.092

.220

.291

.308

.795

.124

.207

.147

-.055

.321

.785

.104

-.034

-.055

.085

Self-Efficacy [SE7: I can enable password policies on my
organizational password.]
Perceived Severity Sanction [PSS3: If I were caught violating
my organization's password policies, I would be punished
severely.]

.142

.609

.056

.108

-.034

.463

.160

-.039

.937

.070

.016

-.017

Perceived Severity Sanction [PSS5: I would receive
reprimand in written report if I were caught violating my
organization's password policies.]

.160

-.043

.914

.065

.045

-.019

Perceived Certainty Sanction [PCS1: If I don't follow
password policies, I will be punished.]
Perceived Severity Sanction [PSS1: My organization
punishes employees who break password policies.]
Perceived Severity Sanction [PSS2: My organization
terminates employees who violate password policies
repeatedly.]

.134

-.028

.886

.220

.127

.050

.102

-.054

.881

.104

.124

.022

.099

.007

.801

.077

.167

-.055

Perceived Severity Sanction [PSS4: I would receive
reprimand in oral if I were caught violating my organization's
password policies. ]

.181

-.110

.737

-.112

.044

.003

Perceived Certainty Sanction [PCS2: If I violate password
policies, I would probably get caught.]
Self-Efficacy [SE5: Following password policies is easy.]

.244

-.046

.710

.243

.130

.069

.218

.243

.043

.175

.124

.681

Self-Efficacy [SE1: I feel comfortable following password
policies to protect my organizational password.]
Self-Efficacy [SE2: Following password policies is entirely
under my control.]
Perceived Severity Threat [PS7: I believe that threat to my
organizational password is significant. ]

.399

.395

-.095

.142

.361

.620

.145

.382

-.005

.388

.153

.451

.496

.064

.300

.284

.476

-.251

Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
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Appendix F: Test of Assumptions
Figure 5
Histogram

Figure 6
P-P Plot
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Figure 7
Collinearity Statistics

Figure 8
Scatterplot
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Figure 9
Durbin-Watson Statistics Results

Figure 10
Cook’s Distance Statistics
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